Parts MCP Server
parts-mcp
PyPI
v0.5.3
Published by sourceparts — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for electronic parts sourcing with KiCad integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], cwd=str(start_p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/tools/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/tools/cli.py:348`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( args, cwd=cwd, capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server parts_mcp/tools/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py:391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: proc = subprocess.run( ["patch", "-p1", "--no-backup-if-mismatch"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:289`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d)}") result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: git HEAD.""" src = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(REPO), "show", "HEAD:parts_mcp/utils/api_client.py"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ("bom") / "bom.csv" subprocess.run( ["kicad-cli", "sch", "export", "bom", "--fields", "Reference,Va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_kicad_projectno sensitive capabilityconvert_allegrono sensitive capabilityconvert_gedano sensitive capabilityconvert_kicad_versionno sensitive capabilityconvert_padsno sensitive capabilityconvert_protelno sensitive capabilitydoc_wip_historyno sensitive capabilitydoc_wip_newno sensitive capabilitydoc_wip_previewno sensitive capabilitydoc_wip_sendno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
export_parts_to_kicadno sensitive capabilityextract_bom_from_kicadno sensitive capabilityextract_netlist_from_projectno sensitive capabilityfind_kicad_projectsno sensitive capabilityhighlight_net_tracesno sensitive capabilitymatch_components_to_partsno sensitive capabilityopen_in_kicadno sensitive capabilitysch_check_structureno sensitive capabilitysch_erc_categorizeno sensitive capabilitysch_libsyncno sensitive capabilitysch_pin_positionno sensitive capabilitysch_remove_wiresno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.5.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan parts-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Web, Search & Scraping
Agent IP: MCP server with patents search tools
MCP server for searching the Agent Almanac — the public catalog of 9,000+ Model Context Protocol servers. Find, install, and discover MCP servers from inside Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed, or any MCP-aware agent.
Search agents & MCP servers by capability, with daily-observed pricing, liveness and market data.
Verified merchants accepting agentic payments on Lightning/L402/BOLT12/USDT — search, verify, pay.
Airframe MCP Client - Connect agents to Airframe's product intelligence
Amazon product search demand over time, with growth for any keyword. Free key at trendsmcp.ai