Ori Memory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ori-memory",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ori-memory"
},
"server": {
"name": "ori-memory"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/claude-code/hooks/capture.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/claude-code/hooks/capture.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/capture.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/capture.mjs",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/claude-code/hooks/orient.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/claude-code/hooks/orient.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/orient.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readdirSync } from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/orient.mjs",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/claude-code/hooks/validate.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/claude-code/hooks/validate.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/validate.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/claude-code/hooks/validate.mjs",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/hermes/plugin/hooks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/hermes/plugin/hooks.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/hermes/plugin/hooks.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"ori\", \"health\"], capture_output=True, text",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/hermes/plugin/hooks.py",
"line": 37,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/opencode/plugin/lifecycle.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`adapters/opencode/plugin/lifecycle.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "adapters/opencode/plugin/lifecycle.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; const LOG_ROOT = process.env.APPDATA || proces",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "adapters/opencode/plugin/lifecycle.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/repl.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/repl.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/repl.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import readline from \"node:readline\"; import chalk from \"chalk\"; import { getVer",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/repl.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/llm.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/llm.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/llm.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; export const DEFAULT_LLM_CONFIG = { provider: null, model: null, api",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/llm.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/providers/anthropic.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/anthropic.js:42`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/anthropic.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/providers/anthropic.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/repl.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/repl.js:57`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/repl.js"
},
"evidence": "h aries-cli execSync(`npx tsx \"${ariesEntry}\"`, { stdio: \"inherit\", cwd: sta",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cli/repl.js",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ori_orient",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_promote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_query_ranked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_explore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_explore_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_explore_expand",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_explore_conclude",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_warmth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_query_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_query_important",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_query_fading",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_prune",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ori_index_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fa5a50f98045ca215294ce517e85efd1beadf8419b791b0ce72922a43ff7693e",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}