Raw scan report

Openocd — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

← Back to the scan page
{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "openocd-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "openocd-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "openocd-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 89,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "critical",
        "label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 10
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "critical",
    "reasons": [
      "ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code",
      "untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
      "untrusted input can reach code execution"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "untrusted-input",
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
      "title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "critical",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: install_openocd → read_registers → run_command. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
      "remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "install_openocd → read_registers → run_command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "untrusted": [
          "install_openocd"
        ],
        "sources": [
          "read_registers"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "run_command"
        ],
        "path": [
          "install_openocd",
          "read_registers",
          "run_command"
        ],
        "edges": [
          {
            "from": "install_openocd",
            "to": "read_registers",
            "kind": "agent-mediated"
          },
          {
            "from": "read_registers",
            "to": "run_command",
            "kind": "agent-mediated"
          }
        ],
        "wired": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"run_command\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"run_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "run_command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (openocd_mcp/launcher.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`openocd_mcp/launcher.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "openocd_mcp/launcher.py"
      },
      "evidence": "self._proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, s",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "openocd_mcp/launcher.py",
        "line": 109,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"run_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"run_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "run_command"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [
    {
      "id": "flow-1",
      "severity": "critical",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "untrustedInput": [
        "install_openocd"
      ],
      "sensitiveSource": [
        "read_registers"
      ],
      "externalSink": [
        "run_command"
      ],
      "selfContained": false,
      "path": [
        "install_openocd",
        "read_registers",
        "run_command"
      ],
      "pathWired": false,
      "description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: install_openocd → read_registers → run_command."
    }
  ],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "configure",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "show_config",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "set_permissions",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "install_openocd",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"download\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "start_openocd",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "stop_openocd",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "connect",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "halt",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "resume",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "reset",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "step",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_registers",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"dump\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_register",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "write_register",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_memory",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "write_memory",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_peripheral",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_breakpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "remove_breakpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_watchpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "remove_watchpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_breakpoints",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "remove_all_breakpoints",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_conditional_breakpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "remove_conditional_breakpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "flash_write",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "flash_info",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "flash_erase_sector",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "load_elf",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_variable",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "write_variable",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_variables",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "watch_variables",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "load_svd",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_peripheral_register",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "write_peripheral_register",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_peripheral_registers",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_command",
      "tags": [
        "code-exec"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "code-exec": [
          "keyword \"run_command\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "09c25da133b64532d19ba835cc8af5e188cf79ea789780beb2fec45d418855fe",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 39,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 1,
      "high": 2,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}