Openocd MCP Server
openocd-mcp
PyPI
v0.4.5
Published by microhenrio — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server to debug microcontrollers from Claude through OpenOCD (flash, halt/step, memory/registers, breakpoints, variables and peripheral registers by name).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: install_openocd → read_registers → run_command. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow install_openocd → read_registers → run_command
high Tool "run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (openocd_mcp/launcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`openocd_mcp/launcher.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server openocd_mcp/launcher.py
low Mutating tool "run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
install_openocdingests untrusted inputread_registersreads sensitive datarun_commandruns code / shelladd_breakpointno sensitive capabilityadd_conditional_breakpointno sensitive capabilityadd_watchpointno sensitive capabilityconfigureno sensitive capabilityconnectno sensitive capabilityflash_erase_sectorno sensitive capabilityflash_infono sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
flash_writeno sensitive capabilityhaltno sensitive capabilitylist_breakpointsno sensitive capabilitylist_peripheral_registersno sensitive capabilitylist_variablesno sensitive capabilityload_elfno sensitive capabilityload_svdno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilityread_peripheralno sensitive capabilityread_peripheral_registerno sensitive capabilityread_registerno sensitive capabilityread_variableno sensitive capabilityremove_all_breakpointsno sensitive capabilityremove_breakpointno sensitive capabilityremove_conditional_breakpointno sensitive capabilityremove_watchpointno sensitive capabilityresetno sensitive capabilityresumeno sensitive capabilityset_permissionsno sensitive capabilityshow_configno sensitive capabilitystart_openocdno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitystepno sensitive capabilitystop_openocdno sensitive capabilitywatch_variablesno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capabilitywrite_peripheral_registerno sensitive capabilitywrite_registerno sensitive capabilitywrite_variableno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.5 latest |
B 89/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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