Openlore — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "openlore",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "openlore"
},
"server": {
"name": "openlore"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (76 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/change-status.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/change-status.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/change-status.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFile, readdir } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join, relative, s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/change-status.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/decisions.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/decisions.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/decisions.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/decisions.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logge",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/doctor.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/drift.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/drift.js:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/drift.js"
},
"evidence": "eturn 'exit'; if (/^exec(?:\\s|$)/.test(last)) return 'exec'; return null; } const SHELL_INTERPRETERS = n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/drift.js",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/enforce.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/enforce.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/enforce.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { lstat } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join } from 'node:path'; impo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/enforce.js",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/import.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/import.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/import.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logge",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/import.js",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/prove.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/prove.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/commands/prove.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { logger } from '../../utils/lo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/commands/prove.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js:57`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js"
},
"evidence": "mod = (await import(specifier)); } catch (err) { throw new Error(`Loc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"directory\" on \"get_env_vars\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_env_vars\" takes a path parameter \"directory\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_env_vars",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.directory"
},
"data": {
"param": "directory"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/container-launch.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/container-launch.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bench/container-launch.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bench/container-launch.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/pinned-repository.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/pinned-repository.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bench/pinned-repository.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'; import { closeSync, existsSync, mkdirS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bench/pinned-repository.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { relative, resolve } from 'nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"openlore\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "openlore"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "orient",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_architecture_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_spec_generation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_spec_repair",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_refactor_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_call_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_duplicate_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_signatures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_subgraph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trace_execution_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mapping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_spec_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_dead_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "structural_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_change_coupling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_architecture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_low_risk_refactor_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_leaf_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_critical_hubs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_function_skeleton",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_god_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_insertion_points",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_spec_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_specs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_retrieval_miss",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_unified",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_spec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_function_body",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_change_proposal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "annotate_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_route_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_middleware_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_schema_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ui_component_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_env_vars",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_env\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_external_packages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_spec_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_test_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_minimal_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cluster",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_landmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "federation_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spec_store_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "working_set_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_impact_certificate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_parallel_work",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "map_in_flight_conflicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_language_support",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report_coverage_gaps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "certify_public_surface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_style_fingerprint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "briefing_since",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_clones",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "locate_symbol_span",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_error_propagation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_env_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_health_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_surprising_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reject_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b80df0221f8dcb30a26618553012245c68b985ca421b30c563b3009ca7853744",
"stats": {
"tools": 76,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 1,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}