Openlore MCP Server
openlore
npm
v3.1.0
Source verified
Published by clay-good — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Persistent architectural memory and structural cognition for AI coding agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/change-status.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/change-status.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFile, readdir } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join, relative, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/change-status.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/decisions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/decisions.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/decisions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/drift.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/drift.js:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eturn 'exit'; if (/^exec(?:\s|$)/.test(last)) return 'exec'; return null; } const SHELL_INTERPRETERS = n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/drift.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/enforce.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/enforce.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { lstat } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join } from 'node:path'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/enforce.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/import.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/import.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/import.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/prove.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/prove.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { logger } from '../../utils/lo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/prove.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js:57`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mod = (await import(specifier)); } catch (err) { throw new Error(`Loc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/analyzer/local-embedding-service.js
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "get_env_vars"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_env_vars" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_env_vars · inputSchema.properties.directory
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/container-launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/container-launch.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bench/container-launch.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/pinned-repository.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/pinned-repository.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'; import { closeSync, existsSync, mkdirS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bench/pinned-repository.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { relative, resolve } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bench/preregistered-rule.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"openlore" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package openlore
Tools 76
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_env_varsreads sensitive dataanalyze_codebaseno sensitive capabilityanalyze_env_impactno sensitive capabilityanalyze_error_propagationno sensitive capabilityanalyze_impactno sensitive capabilityannotate_storyno sensitive capabilityapprove_decisionno sensitive capabilityaudit_spec_coverageno sensitive capabilityblast_radiusno sensitive capabilitybriefing_sinceno sensitive capability
Show 66 more tools ↓
certify_public_surfaceno sensitive capabilitychange_impact_certificateno sensitive capabilitycheck_architectureno sensitive capabilitycheck_spec_driftno sensitive capabilitydetect_changesno sensitive capabilityexplain_retrieval_missno sensitive capabilityfederation_statusno sensitive capabilityfind_clonesno sensitive capabilityfind_dead_codeno sensitive capabilityfind_pathno sensitive capabilitygenerate_change_proposalno sensitive capabilitygenerate_testsno sensitive capabilityget_architecture_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_call_graphno sensitive capabilityget_change_couplingno sensitive capabilityget_clusterno sensitive capabilityget_critical_hubsno sensitive capabilityget_duplicate_reportno sensitive capabilityget_external_packagesno sensitive capabilityget_file_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_function_bodyno sensitive capabilityget_function_skeletonno sensitive capabilityget_god_functionsno sensitive capabilityget_health_mapno sensitive capabilityget_landmarksno sensitive capabilityget_language_supportno sensitive capabilityget_leaf_functionsno sensitive capabilityget_low_risk_refactor_candidatesno sensitive capabilityget_mapno sensitive capabilityget_mappingno sensitive capabilityget_middleware_inventoryno sensitive capabilityget_minimal_contextno sensitive capabilityget_refactor_reportno sensitive capabilityget_route_inventoryno sensitive capabilityget_schema_inventoryno sensitive capabilityget_signaturesno sensitive capabilityget_specno sensitive capabilityget_style_fingerprintno sensitive capabilityget_subgraphno sensitive capabilityget_surprising_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_test_coverageno sensitive capabilityget_ui_component_inventoryno sensitive capabilitylist_decisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_spec_domainsno sensitive capabilitylocate_symbol_spanno sensitive capabilitymap_in_flight_conflictsno sensitive capabilityorientno sensitive capabilityplan_parallel_workno sensitive capabilityprepare_spec_generationno sensitive capabilityprepare_spec_repairno sensitive capabilityrecallno sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capabilityreject_decisionno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityreport_coverage_gapsno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_specsno sensitive capabilitysearch_unifiedno sensitive capabilityselect_testsno sensitive capabilityspec_store_statusno sensitive capabilitystructural_diffno sensitive capabilitysuggest_insertion_pointsno sensitive capabilitysync_decisionsno sensitive capabilitytrace_execution_pathno sensitive capabilityverify_claimno sensitive capabilityworking_set_contextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (76 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v3.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v2.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v2.1.9 |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.1.8 |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v2.1.7 |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
v2.1.6 |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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