Openchrome — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "openchrome-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "openchrome-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "openchrome-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 80,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/tools/file-upload.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-upload.js:60`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/file-upload.js"
},
"evidence": "nupg', '.aws', '.env', 'id_rsa', 'id_ed25519', '.npmrc']; const definition = { name: 'file_upload', description:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/tools/file-upload.js",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js"
},
"evidence": "Adapter = void 0; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const util_1 = require(\"util\"); const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js"
},
"evidence": "Adapter = void 0; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const util_1 = require(\"util\"); const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js"
},
"evidence": "uppeteer-core\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = __importStar(require(\"fs\")); const os = _",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js",
"line": 54,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js"
},
"evidence": "omeHeadlessShell; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = __importStar(require(\"fs\")); const os = _",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/launcher.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/launcher.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/launcher.js"
},
"evidence": "uncherForTesting; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const path = __importStar(require(\"path\")); const fs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/launcher.js",
"line": 43,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js:302`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const out = execFileSync('ps', ['-ww', '-o', 'command=', '-p', Stri",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js",
"line": 302,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/process-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/process-detector.js:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/process-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const LOG_PREFIX = '[openchrome:process-detector]';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/process-detector.js",
"line": 55,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/profile-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/profile-manager.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chrome/profile-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "r(require(\"os\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); // -------------------------------------------------",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chrome/profile-manager.js",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/claude-session.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/claude-session.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/claude-session.js"
},
"evidence": "r(require(\"os\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const claude_cli_1 = require(\"./claude-cli\"); const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/claude-session.js",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const child_process_2 = require(\"child_process\"); //",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js:71`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js"
},
"evidence": "2') { out = execSync(`netstat -ano | findstr :${port}`, { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 3000 }); co",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js",
"line": 71,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/pid-manager.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/pid-manager.js:161`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/pid-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "equire('child_process').execSync(`taskkill /T /F /PID ${pid}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/utils/pid-manager.js",
"line": 161,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/admin-keys.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/admin-keys.js:50`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/admin-keys.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = require(spec); if (mod && mod.ApiKeyStore) return mod.ApiKeyStore;",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/cli/admin-keys.js",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js:24`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js"
},
"evidence": "require-imports require(name); return true; } catch { return false; } } const checkO",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "oc_proxy_hook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_react",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "act",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_paginate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "computer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_get_connection_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_copy_to_clipboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_open_host_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_connection_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "console_capture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cookies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crawl_cancel",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crawl_sitemap",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crawl_start",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crawl_status",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "crawl",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drag_drop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "element_pick",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "emulate_device",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fill_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "form_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "geolocation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "http_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_qa",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "interact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "javascript_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lightweight_scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_profiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_capture_full",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_capture_lite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_assert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_context_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_context_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_devtools_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_doctor_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_evidence_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_gate_inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_journal_compact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_observe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_output_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "oc_performance_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_performance_insights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_pilot_run_with_recovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "oc_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
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