Openchrome MCP Server
openchrome-mcp
npm
v1.12.9
Published by shaun0927 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Open-source browser automation MCP server. Control your real Chrome from any AI agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 11 = 80. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/tools/file-upload.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-upload.js:60`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nupg', '.aws', '.env', 'id_rsa', 'id_ed25519', '.npmrc']; const definition = { name: 'file_upload', description:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/file-upload.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Adapter = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/adapters/bitwarden-adapter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Adapter = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/adapters/onepassword-adapter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uppeteer-core")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); const os = _
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/headed-fallback.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: omeHeadlessShell; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); const os = _
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/launcher-chrome-paths.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/launcher.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uncherForTesting; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); const fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js:302`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const out = execFileSync('ps', ['-ww', '-o', 'command=', '-p', Stri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/ownership-marker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/process-detector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/process-detector.js:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const LOG_PREFIX = '[openchrome:process-detector]';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/process-detector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chrome/profile-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chrome/profile-manager.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); // -------------------------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chrome/profile-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/claude-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/claude-session.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r(require("os")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const claude_cli_1 = require("./claude-cli"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/claude-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const child_process_2 = require("child_process"); //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-binary.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js:71`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 2') { out = execSync(`netstat -ano | findstr :${port}`, { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 3000 }); co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor/checks/chrome-port.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/pid-manager.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/pid-manager.js:161`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`taskkill /T /F /PID ${pid}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/pid-manager.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/admin-keys.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/admin-keys.js:50`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = require(spec); if (mod && mod.ApiKeyStore) return mod.ApiKeyStore;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/admin-keys.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js:24`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require-imports require(name); return true; } catch { return false; } } const checkO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor/checks/optional-deps.js
Tools 74
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crawlingests untrusted inputcrawl_cancelingests untrusted inputcrawl_sitemapingests untrusted inputcrawl_startingests untrusted inputcrawl_statusingests untrusted inputoc_output_fetchingests untrusted inputactno sensitive capabilitybatch_executeno sensitive capabilitybatch_paginateno sensitive capabilitycomputerno sensitive capability
Show 64 more tools ↓
console_captureno sensitive capabilitycookiesno sensitive capabilitydrag_dropno sensitive capabilityelement_pickno sensitive capabilityemulate_deviceno sensitive capabilityexecute_planno sensitive capabilityextract_datano sensitive capabilityfile_uploadno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilityform_inputno sensitive capabilitygeolocationno sensitive capabilityhttp_authno sensitive capabilityimage_qano sensitive capabilityinspectno sensitive capabilityinteractno sensitive capabilityjavascript_toolno sensitive capabilitylightweight_scrollno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitymemoryno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitynetworkno sensitive capabilitynetwork_capture_fullno sensitive capabilitynetwork_capture_liteno sensitive capabilityoc_assertno sensitive capabilityoc_connection_healthno sensitive capabilityoc_context_exportno sensitive capabilityoc_context_importno sensitive capabilityoc_copy_to_clipboardno sensitive capabilityoc_credentialsno sensitive capabilityoc_devtools_urlno sensitive capabilityoc_doctor_reportno sensitive capabilityoc_evidence_bundleno sensitive capabilityoc_gate_inspectno sensitive capabilityoc_get_connection_infono sensitive capabilityoc_journal_compactno sensitive capabilityoc_observeno sensitive capabilityoc_open_host_settingsno sensitive capabilityoc_performance_analyzeno sensitive capabilityoc_performance_insightsno sensitive capabilityoc_pilot_run_with_recoveryno sensitive capabilityoc_profile_statusno sensitive capabilityoc_proxy_hookno sensitive capabilityoc_queryno sensitive capabilityoc_reactno sensitive capabilityoc_reap_orphansno sensitive capabilityoc_reflectno sensitive capabilityoc_skill_recallno sensitive capabilityoc_skill_recordno sensitive capabilityoc_skill_replayno sensitive capabilitypage_contentno sensitive capabilitypage_pdfno sensitive capabilitypage_reloadno sensitive capabilitypage_screenshotno sensitive capabilityperformance_metricsno sensitive capabilityquery_domno sensitive capabilityread_pageno sensitive capabilityworker_completeno sensitive capabilityworker_updateno sensitive capabilityworkflow_cleanupno sensitive capabilityworkflow_collectno sensitive capabilityworkflow_collect_partialno sensitive capabilityworkflow_initno sensitive capabilityworkflow_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.12.9 latest |
B 80/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan openchrome-mcp --onlineMore in Browser Automation
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates AgentQL data extraction capabilities.
Screenshot any URL or HTML as PNG/JPEG/WebP from your AI agent. Full-page, clean, no install.
MCP server for aria51 accessibility scanner
Bridge any browser web app to Claude Code via MCP
Browserbase’s official MCP server: cloud headless browsers for agents, with sessions and screenshots.
MCP server for AI web browser automation using Browserbase and Stagehand