Omniwire — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "omniwire",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "omniwire"
},
"server": {
"name": "omniwire"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 82,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (87 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: omniwire_metrics → omniwire_list_files → omniwire_alert. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "omniwire_metrics → omniwire_list_files → omniwire_alert"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"omniwire_metrics",
"omniwire_scrape"
],
"sources": [
"omniwire_read_file",
"omniwire_list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"omniwire_exec",
"omniwire_shell",
"omniwire_alert",
"omniwire_events"
],
"path": [
"omniwire_metrics",
"omniwire_list_files",
"omniwire_alert"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "omniwire_metrics",
"to": "omniwire_list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "omniwire_list_files",
"to": "omniwire_alert",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"omniwire_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"omniwire_shell\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_shell\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_shell"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude/integration.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/claude/integration.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/claude/integration.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { allNodes, NODE_ROLES } from '../protocol/config.js'; import { cyan, dim",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/claude/integration.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server.js:4388`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp/server.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import('node:child_process'); try { const out = execSync(cmd, { timeout:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mcp/server.js",
"line": 4388,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nodes/manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/nodes/manager.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/nodes/manager.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { remoteNodes, getHostCandidates } from '../protocol/config.js'; const MA",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/nodes/manager.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sync/secrets.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/sync/secrets.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/sync/secrets.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/sync/secrets.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/update.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/update.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/update.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/update.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/update.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/update.js:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/update.js"
},
"evidence": "'\\\\\"')}\"` : a); exec(`${cmd} ${escaped.join(' ')}`, { timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true }, (err, stdout, std",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/update.js",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"omniwire_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"omniwire_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"omniwire_write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"omniwire_shell\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"omniwire_shell\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "omniwire_shell"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"omniwire\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "omniwire"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"omniwire_metrics",
"omniwire_scrape"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"omniwire_read_file",
"omniwire_list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"omniwire_exec",
"omniwire_shell",
"omniwire_alert",
"omniwire_events"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"omniwire_metrics",
"omniwire_list_files",
"omniwire_alert"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: omniwire_metrics → omniwire_list_files → omniwire_alert."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "omniwire_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_broadcast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_mesh_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_node_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_transfer_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_find_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_tail_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_process_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_disk_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_install_package",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_service_control",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_docker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_open_browser",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_port_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_kernel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_stream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_shell",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_live_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_cron",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_env",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_vpn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_firewall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_cookies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_cdp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_dns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_cert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_schedule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_alert",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_log_aggregate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_benchmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_clipboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_git",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_syslog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_watch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_healthcheck",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_agent_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_a2a_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_semaphore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_agent_registry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_blackboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_task_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_capability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_snippet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_alias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_metrics",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_plugin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_2fa",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_coc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_scrape",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_omnimesh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_events",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_mesh_expose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_mesh_gateway",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_sync_now",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_search_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_get_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_manifest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cybersync_force_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_secrets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_sync_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "omniwire_sync_hooks",
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