Omniwire (npm) MCP Server
omniwire
npm
v3.5.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Infrastructure layer for AI agent swarms — 88 MCP tools · A2A · OmniMesh VPN · Scrapling scraper · COC sync · nftables firewall · CDP browser · 2FA TOTP · ~80ms
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: omniwire_metrics → omniwire_list_files → omniwire_alert. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow omniwire_metrics → omniwire_list_files → omniwire_alert
high Tool "omniwire_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "omniwire_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool omniwire_exec
high Tool "omniwire_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "omniwire_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool omniwire_shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude/integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claude/integration.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { allNodes, NODE_ROLES } from '../protocol/config.js'; import { cyan, dim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claude/integration.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server.js:4388`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); try { const out = execSync(cmd, { timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/nodes/manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/nodes/manager.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { remoteNodes, getHostCandidates } from '../protocol/config.js'; const MA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/nodes/manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sync/secrets.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sync/secrets.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sync/secrets.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/update.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/update.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/update.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/update.js:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '\\"')}"` : a); exec(`${cmd} ${escaped.join(' ')}`, { timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true }, (err, stdout, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/update.js
medium Tool "omniwire_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "omniwire_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool omniwire_write_file
low Mutating tool "omniwire_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "omniwire_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool omniwire_exec
low Mutating tool "omniwire_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "omniwire_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool omniwire_write_file
low Mutating tool "omniwire_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "omniwire_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool omniwire_shell
Tools 87
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
omniwire_alertnetwork egressomniwire_eventsnetwork egressomniwire_execruns code / shellomniwire_list_filesreads sensitive dataomniwire_metricsingests untrusted inputomniwire_read_filereads sensitive dataomniwire_scrapeingests untrusted inputomniwire_shellruns code / shellomniwire_write_filewrites filescybersync_diffno sensitive capability
Show 77 more tools ↓
cybersync_force_pushno sensitive capabilitycybersync_get_memoryno sensitive capabilitycybersync_historyno sensitive capabilitycybersync_manifestno sensitive capabilitycybersync_search_knowledgeno sensitive capabilitycybersync_statusno sensitive capabilitycybersync_sync_nowno sensitive capabilityomniwire_2fano sensitive capabilityomniwire_a2a_messageno sensitive capabilityomniwire_agent_registryno sensitive capabilityomniwire_agent_taskno sensitive capabilityomniwire_aliasno sensitive capabilityomniwire_auditno sensitive capabilityomniwire_backupno sensitive capabilityomniwire_batchno sensitive capabilityomniwire_benchmarkno sensitive capabilityomniwire_blackboardno sensitive capabilityomniwire_broadcastno sensitive capabilityomniwire_capabilityno sensitive capabilityomniwire_cdpno sensitive capabilityomniwire_certno sensitive capabilityomniwire_clipboardno sensitive capabilityomniwire_cocno sensitive capabilityomniwire_containerno sensitive capabilityomniwire_cookiesno sensitive capabilityomniwire_cronno sensitive capabilityomniwire_deployno sensitive capabilityomniwire_disk_usageno sensitive capabilityomniwire_dnsno sensitive capabilityomniwire_dockerno sensitive capabilityomniwire_doctorno sensitive capabilityomniwire_envno sensitive capabilityomniwire_eventno sensitive capabilityomniwire_find_filesno sensitive capabilityomniwire_firewallno sensitive capabilityomniwire_gitno sensitive capabilityomniwire_healthcheckno sensitive capabilityomniwire_install_packageno sensitive capabilityomniwire_kernelno sensitive capabilityomniwire_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityomniwire_live_monitorno sensitive capabilityomniwire_log_aggregateno sensitive capabilityomniwire_mesh_exposeno sensitive capabilityomniwire_mesh_gatewayno sensitive capabilityomniwire_mesh_statusno sensitive capabilityomniwire_networkno sensitive capabilityomniwire_node_infono sensitive capabilityomniwire_omnimeshno sensitive capabilityomniwire_open_browserno sensitive capabilityomniwire_pipelineno sensitive capabilityomniwire_pluginno sensitive capabilityomniwire_port_forwardno sensitive capabilityomniwire_process_listno sensitive capabilityomniwire_proxyno sensitive capabilityomniwire_runno sensitive capabilityomniwire_scheduleno sensitive capabilityomniwire_secretsno sensitive capabilityomniwire_semaphoreno sensitive capabilityomniwire_service_controlno sensitive capabilityomniwire_snippetno sensitive capabilityomniwire_storeno sensitive capabilityomniwire_streamno sensitive capabilityomniwire_syncno sensitive capabilityomniwire_sync_agentsno sensitive capabilityomniwire_sync_hooksno sensitive capabilityomniwire_sync_memoryno sensitive capabilityomniwire_sync_rulesno sensitive capabilityomniwire_syslogno sensitive capabilityomniwire_tail_logno sensitive capabilityomniwire_task_queueno sensitive capabilityomniwire_traceno sensitive capabilityomniwire_transfer_fileno sensitive capabilityomniwire_updateno sensitive capabilityomniwire_userno sensitive capabilityomniwire_vpnno sensitive capabilityomniwire_watchno sensitive capabilityomniwire_workflowno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (87 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.5.0 latest |
B 82/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan omniwire --onlineOther implementations of Omniwire 1
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