Omnibridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "omnibridge-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "omnibridge-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "omnibridge-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_issue_details → get_logging_data → create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_issue_details → get_logging_data → create_issue"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_repo_details",
"get_issue_details",
"list_recent_discord_messages"
],
"sources": [
"get_logging_data"
],
"sinks": [
"create_issue",
"create_pull_request"
],
"path": [
"get_issue_details",
"get_logging_data",
"create_issue"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_issue_details",
"to": "get_logging_data",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "get_logging_data",
"to": "create_issue",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/db/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/db/init.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/db/init.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\"; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/db/init.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"omnibridge-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "omnibridge-mcp"
},
"evidence": "prisma generate",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"omnibridge-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "omnibridge-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_repo_details",
"get_issue_details",
"list_recent_discord_messages"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_logging_data"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_issue",
"create_pull_request"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_issue_details",
"get_logging_data",
"create_issue"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_issue_details → get_logging_data → create_issue."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_repo_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_repo_visibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_all_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repo_details",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "fork_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "star_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unstar_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "close_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_all_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_details",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_issue_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repo_views",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_repo_clone_count",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_referrers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_paths",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contributor_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_commit_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_following",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_notification_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pull_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_pull_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "merge_pull_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_pull_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pull_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pull_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_pr_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_collaborators",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_collaborators",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_collaborators",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_logging_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_logs\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_discord_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_recent_discord_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_available_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "930791840362dfb5517e33fb67e22ca16e71e48389d9f952e7f9cc53587e5338",
"stats": {
"tools": 44,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}