Omnibridge (npm) MCP Server
omnibridge-mcp
npm
v1.0.8
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 12 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_issue_details → get_logging_data → create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_issue_details → get_logging_data → create_issue
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/db/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/db/init.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/db/init.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"omnibridge-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: prisma generate
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package omnibridge-mcp
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egressget_issue_detailsingests untrusted inputget_logging_datareads sensitive dataget_repo_detailsingests untrusted inputlist_recent_discord_messagesingests untrusted inputadd_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_pr_commentno sensitive capabilitychange_repo_visibilityno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
close_issueno sensitive capabilityclose_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_repono sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_repono sensitive capabilityfork_repono sensitive capabilityget_branchno sensitive capabilityget_commit_activityno sensitive capabilityget_contributor_statsno sensitive capabilityget_my_profileno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_repo_clone_countno sensitive capabilityget_repo_viewsno sensitive capabilityget_top_pathsno sensitive capabilityget_top_referrersno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilitylist_all_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_all_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_available_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilitylist_followersno sensitive capabilitylist_followingno sensitive capabilitylist_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitymark_notification_readno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilitysend_discord_messageno sensitive capabilitystar_repono sensitive capabilityunstar_repono sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_repo_metadatano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.8 latest |
B 87/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan omnibridge-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Omnibridge 1
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