Omni Coder Dashboard MCP Server
omni-coder-dashboard
npm
v5.5.0
Published by riko5652 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
OCD (Omni Coder Dashboard) — An AI memory engine with real semantic embeddings, 21 MCP tools, cross-tool routing, trace auditing, and proactive IDE interception. 100% local, zero API keys required.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (apps/server/dist/adapters/claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/adapters/claude-code.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { config } from '../config.js'; // Cache: filepath -> { mtime, session, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/adapters/claude-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (apps/server/dist/engine/git-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/engine/git-scanner.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync } from 'fs'; import { join, basename } from 'pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/engine/git-scanner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (apps/server/dist/engine/ide-interceptor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/engine/ide-interceptor.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { getDb } from '../db/index.js'; import { embedText, cosineSimilarity } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/engine/ide-interceptor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (apps/server/dist/engine/trace-auditor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/engine/trace-auditor.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { getDb } from '../db/index.js'; import { getTemplate, extractAuditEntiti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/engine/trace-auditor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/ai-dashboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/ai-dashboard.js:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = await import('child_process'); const cmd = platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : platform === '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/ai-dashboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/doctor.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/doctor.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/doctor.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/feedback.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/feedback.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import os from 'os'; const repoUrl = 'https://github.com/Riko5652/OCD/issues
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/feedback.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/ocd-hook.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/ocd-hook.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname(fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/ocd-hook.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (apps/server/dist/engine/llm-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/engine/llm-analyzer.js:230`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const r = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/engine/llm-analyzer.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (apps/server/dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/index.js:443`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (apps/server/dist/lib/vector-store.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/lib/vector-store.js:66`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/lib/vector-store.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (apps/server/dist/routes/intelligence.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`apps/server/dist/routes/intelligence.js:386`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/omni-coder-dashboard/latest', { headers: { Acc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server apps/server/dist/routes/intelligence.js
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_knowledge_contextingests untrusted inputget_active_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget_arbitrage_recommendationno sensitive capabilityget_attribution_reportno sensitive capabilityget_audit_historyno sensitive capabilityget_audit_templatesno sensitive capabilityget_current_taskno sensitive capabilityget_efficiency_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_efficiency_tipsno sensitive capabilityget_last_session_contextno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_model_comparisonno sensitive capabilityget_negative_constraintsno sensitive capabilityget_optimal_prompt_structureno sensitive capabilityget_project_statsno sensitive capabilityget_routing_recommendationno sensitive capabilityget_session_health_checkno sensitive capabilityget_similar_solutionsno sensitive capabilityget_team_memoryno sensitive capabilityget_topic_summaryno sensitive capabilitypark_out_of_scope_ideano sensitive capabilitypush_handoff_noteno sensitive capabilityrun_trace_auditno sensitive capabilitysubmit_ide_traceno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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