Notion Full MCP Server
notion-full-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.1
Published by cphoskins — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Full-featured Notion MCP server with deep page reading, surgical editing, snapshot/restore, file uploads (Notion-hosted images/PDFs), table row manipulation, and all block types
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_image_block → query_database → create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_image_block → query_database → create_comment
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_commentnetwork egressdownload_image_blockingests untrusted inputget_page_infoingests untrusted inputquery_databasereads sensitive dataread_page_deepingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressupload_file_as_blocknetwork egressappend_blocks_to_pageno sensitive capabilitycopy_page_to_parentno sensitive capabilitycreate_pageno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
delete_blockno sensitive capabilityfind_replace_in_blockno sensitive capabilityget_blockno sensitive capabilityget_databaseno sensitive capabilityget_selfno sensitive capabilityinsert_blocks_afterno sensitive capabilityinsert_table_rowno sensitive capabilityinsert_text_afterno sensitive capabilitylist_block_childrenno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitymove_pageno sensitive capabilityreplace_image_blockno sensitive capabilityrestore_pageno sensitive capabilityrestore_page_from_snapshotno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_pagesno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_block_rich_textno sensitive capabilityupdate_block_textno sensitive capabilityupdate_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_table_cellno sensitive capabilityupload_image_as_blockno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan notion-full-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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