Notebook Intelligence — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "notebook-intelligence",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "notebook-intelligence"
},
"server": {
"name": "notebook-intelligence"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files, read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command, run_command_in_jupyter_terminal, run_command_in_embedded_terminal]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_files → execute_command"
},
"evidence": "sources [list_files, read_file] → sinks [execute_command, run_command_in_jupyter_terminal, run_command_in_embedded_terminal]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"list_files",
"read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"execute_command",
"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal",
"run_command_in_embedded_terminal"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"execute_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run_command_in_embedded_terminal\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run_command_in_embedded_terminal\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_command_in_embedded_terminal"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py:793`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py"
},
"evidence": "mmand) result = subprocess.run( cmd_list, cwd=str(work_dir), capture_output=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py",
"line": 793,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (notebook_intelligence/util.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`notebook_intelligence/util.py:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "notebook_intelligence/util.py"
},
"evidence": "before handing it to ``subprocess.Popen(cwd=...)``, ``docmanager:open``, ``terminal:create-new``, or any other shel",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "notebook_intelligence/util.py",
"line": 55,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"execute_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run_command_in_embedded_terminal\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_command_in_embedded_terminal\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_command_in_embedded_terminal"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "y` straight through to `subprocess.Popen(cwd=...)`. An LLM-supplied path of '/etc' or '..' would spawn a subprocess outs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py"
},
"evidence": "'\\n\" ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", code], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=11",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py:264`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py"
},
"evidence": "test itself may spawn (xdist workers, coverage helpers) so the assertion isolates the shim's own footpri",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py",
"line": 264,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py"
},
"evidence": "s, time\\n\" \"kids = [subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', 'import time; time.sleep(120)'])\" \" for _ in range({",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files",
"read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"execute_command",
"run_command_in_jupyter_terminal",
"run_command_in_embedded_terminal"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"list_files",
"execute_command"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: list_files → execute_command."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_available_notebook_kernels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_new_notebook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_notebook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_markdown_cell",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_code_cell",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_number_of_cells",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cell_type_and_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cell_output",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_cell_type_and_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_cell",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "insert_cell",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_cell",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_notebook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_new_python_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_file_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "insert_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "write_to_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"execute command\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_command\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "run_command_in_embedded_terminal",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_command\" in tool name"
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9142c978784cb59578aead1880304a1f3af7f11c7976be38b995873f9789e965",
"stats": {
"tools": 24,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 0,
"low": 8,
"info": 0
}
}
}