Notebook Intelligence (plmbr) MCP Server
notebook-intelligence
PyPI
v5.3.0
Published by plmbr — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files, read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command, run_command_in_jupyter_terminal, run_command_in_embedded_terminal]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files, read_file] → sinks [execute_command, run_command_in_jupyter_terminal, run_command_in_embedded_terminal]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Tool "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command_in_jupyter_terminal
high Tool "run_command_in_embedded_terminal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command_in_embedded_terminal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command_in_embedded_terminal
high Shell/command execution in server code (notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py:793`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mmand) result = subprocess.run( cmd_list, cwd=str(work_dir), capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server notebook_intelligence/built_in_toolsets.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (notebook_intelligence/util.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`notebook_intelligence/util.py:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: before handing it to ``subprocess.Popen(cwd=...)``, ``docmanager:open``, ``terminal:create-new``, or any other shel
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server notebook_intelligence/util.py
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command_in_jupyter_terminal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command_in_jupyter_terminal
low Mutating tool "run_command_in_embedded_terminal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command_in_embedded_terminal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command_in_embedded_terminal
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/claude_perf/bench_terminal.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y` straight through to `subprocess.Popen(cwd=...)`. An LLM-supplied path of '/etc' or '..' would spawn a subprocess outs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_builtin_toolset_cwd_sandbox.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '\n" ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=11
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_lazy_provider_imports.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py:264`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: test itself may spawn (xdist workers, coverage helpers) so the assertion isolates the shim's own footpri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_client_shim.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s, time\n" "kids = [subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', 'import time; time.sleep(120)'])" " for _ in range({
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_process_tree_teardown.py
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_commandruns code / shelllist_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datarun_command_in_embedded_terminalruns code / shellrun_command_in_jupyter_terminalruns code / shelladd_code_cellno sensitive capabilityadd_markdown_cellno sensitive capabilitycreate_new_notebookno sensitive capabilitycreate_new_python_fileno sensitive capabilitydelete_cellno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_cell_outputno sensitive capabilityget_cell_type_and_sourceno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_number_of_cellsno sensitive capabilityinsert_cellno sensitive capabilityinsert_contentno sensitive capabilitylist_available_notebook_kernelsno sensitive capabilityrename_notebookno sensitive capabilityrun_cellno sensitive capabilitysave_notebookno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilityset_cell_type_and_sourceno sensitive capabilityset_file_contentno sensitive capabilitywrite_to_fileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan notebook-intelligence --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Notebook Intelligence 1
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