Noosphere — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "noosphere-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "noosphere-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "noosphere-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py:4614`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": ") subprocess.Popen([\"powershell\", \"-WindowStyle\", \"Hidden\", \"-Command\", ps_script],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py",
"line": 4614,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/notifications/daemon.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`noosphere/notifications/daemon.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "noosphere/notifications/daemon.py"
},
"evidence": ") subprocess.Popen([\"powershell\", \"-WindowStyle\", \"Hidden\", \"-Command\", ps_script],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "noosphere/notifications/daemon.py",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py:167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py"
},
"evidence": "Result: completed = subprocess.run( [os.fspath(item) for item in command], cwd=cwd, env=_cle",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py",
"line": 167,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (test_notify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`test_notify.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "test_notify.py"
},
"evidence": ") subprocess.Popen([\"powershell\", \"-WindowStyle\", \"Hidden\", \"-Command\", ps_script],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "test_notify.py",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (noosphere/boot_animation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`noosphere/boot_animation.py:210`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "noosphere/boot_animation.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(mod_name) except ImportError: dep_ok = False dep_miss",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "noosphere/boot_animation.py",
"line": 210,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py"
},
"evidence": "EN\", None) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", code], cwd=REPO_ROOT, env=env,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py",
"line": 55,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_package_import_boundary.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_package_import_boundary.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_package_import_boundary.py"
},
"evidence": "_ROOT) completed = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", code], cwd=SDK_ROOT.parent, env=e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_package_import_boundary.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_preflight.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_preflight.py:308`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_preflight.py"
},
"evidence": "return importlib.__import__(name) with patch(\"importlib.import_module\", side_effect=mock_import): wi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_preflight.py",
"line": 308,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"noosphere-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "noosphere-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "upload_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consult_noosphere",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telepath",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resonate_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_consciousness_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_resonance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trace_evolution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discuss_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_echoes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "daily_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_consciousness_rank",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "soul_mirror",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consciousness_challenge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consciousness_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hologram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_engagement_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_engagement_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "follow_creator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_social_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_network_pulse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_telepathy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_telepathy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telepathy_threads",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "launch_preflight",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_growth_referral",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_share_attribution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_attribution_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "growth_flywheel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "group_telepathy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subscribe_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "my_subscriptions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_shared_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_shared_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_skill_updates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_skill_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_skill_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_shared_skill_withdrawal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "withdraw_consciousness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_voice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_video",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resonate_media",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "96cae1596cd7cff993f6367b3b0a7927c644402ae054f7c399169c4310dbd975",
"stats": {
"tools": 46,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 1
}
}
}