Noosphere MCP Server
noosphere-mcp
PyPI
v0.10.0
Published by jinning6 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
🧠 Noosphere — 集体意识网络 MCP Server，直连 GitHub 意识仓库
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py:4614`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) subprocess.Popen(["powershell", "-WindowStyle", "Hidden", "-Command", ps_script],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server noosphere/noosphere_mcp.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/notifications/daemon.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`noosphere/notifications/daemon.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) subprocess.Popen(["powershell", "-WindowStyle", "Hidden", "-Command", ps_script],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server noosphere/notifications/daemon.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py:167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Result: completed = subprocess.run( [os.fspath(item) for item in command], cwd=cwd, env=_cle
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server noosphere/validation_kits/public_artifact_runtime_smoke_gate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (test_notify.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test_notify.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) subprocess.Popen(["powershell", "-WindowStyle", "Hidden", "-Command", ps_script],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_notify.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (noosphere/boot_animation.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`noosphere/boot_animation.py:210`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(mod_name) except ImportError: dep_ok = False dep_miss
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server noosphere/boot_animation.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: EN", None) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=REPO_ROOT, env=env,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_context_budget.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_package_import_boundary.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_package_import_boundary.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _ROOT) completed = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=SDK_ROOT.parent, env=e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_package_import_boundary.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_preflight.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_preflight.py:308`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return importlib.__import__(name) with patch("importlib.import_module", side_effect=mock_import): wi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_preflight.py
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
telepathy_threadsingests untrusted inputcheck_skill_updatesno sensitive capabilityconsciousness_challengeno sensitive capabilityconsciousness_mapno sensitive capabilityconsult_noosphereno sensitive capabilitydaily_consciousnessno sensitive capabilitydiscover_resonanceno sensitive capabilitydiscuss_consciousnessno sensitive capabilityfollow_creatorno sensitive capabilityget_consciousness_profileno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
get_engagement_modeno sensitive capabilityget_shared_skillno sensitive capabilitygroup_telepathyno sensitive capabilitygrowth_flywheelno sensitive capabilityhologramno sensitive capabilitylaunch_preflightno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_skillsno sensitive capabilitymerge_consciousnessno sensitive capabilitymy_consciousness_rankno sensitive capabilitymy_echoesno sensitive capabilitymy_followersno sensitive capabilitymy_network_pulseno sensitive capabilitymy_notificationsno sensitive capabilitymy_social_graphno sensitive capabilitymy_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityread_telepathyno sensitive capabilityrecord_growth_referralno sensitive capabilityrecord_share_attributionno sensitive capabilityrecord_skill_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrequest_shared_skill_withdrawalno sensitive capabilityresonate_consciousnessno sensitive capabilityresonate_mediano sensitive capabilitysend_telepathyno sensitive capabilityset_engagement_modeno sensitive capabilityshare_attribution_reportno sensitive capabilityshare_consciousnessno sensitive capabilitysoul_mirrorno sensitive capabilitysubmit_skill_evidenceno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_tagsno sensitive capabilitytelepathno sensitive capabilitytrace_evolutionno sensitive capabilityupload_consciousnessno sensitive capabilityupload_imageno sensitive capabilityupload_videono sensitive capabilityupload_voiceno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_consciousnessno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.9.2 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v0.9.1 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.9.0 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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