Neuromcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "neuromcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "neuromcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "neuromcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 6.3,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/doctor.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/doctor.mjs:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/doctor.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/doctor.mjs",
"line": 21
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/enable-consolidation.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/enable-consolidation.mjs:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/enable-consolidation.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/enable-consolidation.mjs",
"line": 25
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/enable-daemon.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/enable-daemon.mjs:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/enable-daemon.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/enable-daemon.mjs",
"line": 38
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/enable-zombie-cleanup.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/enable-zombie-cleanup.mjs:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/enable-zombie-cleanup.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/enable-zombie-cleanup.mjs",
"line": 36
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/init-wiki.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/init-wiki.mjs:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/init-wiki.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/init-wiki.mjs",
"line": 22
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/init.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/init.mjs:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/init.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/init.mjs",
"line": 41
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/neuromcp-connect.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/neuromcp-connect.mjs:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/neuromcp-connect.mjs"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/neuromcp-connect.mjs",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-IAJG7PHQ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-IAJG7PHQ.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-IAJG7PHQ.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-IAJG7PHQ.js",
"line": 35
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/consolidate-sessions.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/consolidate-sessions.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/consolidate-sessions.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/consolidate-sessions.py",
"line": 208
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (templates/hooks/neuromcp-auto-capture.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`templates/hooks/neuromcp-auto-capture.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "templates/hooks/neuromcp-auto-capture.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "templates/hooks/neuromcp-auto-capture.js",
"line": 20
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/chunk-74HDHEJS.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-74HDHEJS.js:12`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-74HDHEJS.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`\n CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS memories_vec\n USING vec0(\n id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n embedding float[${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/chunk-74HDHEJS.js",
"line": 12
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/query.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/query.mjs:88`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/query.mjs"
},
"evidence": "import(distPath)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "bin/query.mjs",
"line": 88
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"neuromcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "neuromcp"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "497f4d3a86dfe9b1325d2c7e0119927a5ef28418a1eb569fffc76dc336de140a",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}