Msoutlook — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "msoutlook-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "msoutlook-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "msoutlook-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/browser-login.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browser-login.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/browser-login.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; import { OWA_URL, LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/browser-login.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/browser/cookie-import.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/cookie-import.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/browser/cookie-import.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; // ────────────────────────────────",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/browser/cookie-import.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([outlook_get_user_photo, outlook_get_unread, outlook_save_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([outlook_send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "outlook_get_user_photo → outlook_send_email"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [outlook_get_user_photo, outlook_get_unread, outlook_save_attachment] → sinks [outlook_send_email]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"outlook_get_user_photo",
"outlook_get_unread",
"outlook_save_attachment"
],
"sinks": [
"outlook_send_email"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auth/browser-login.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browser-login.js:68`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/browser-login.js"
},
"evidence": "); const json = execSync(`plutil -convert json -o - \"${plistPath}\"`, { encoding: 'utf8',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/auth/browser-login.js",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/browser/cookie-import.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/cookie-import.js:185`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/browser/cookie-import.js"
},
"evidence": "const password = execSync(`security find-generic-password -s \"${keychainService}\" -w`, { encoding: 'utf8', timeou",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/browser/cookie-import.js",
"line": 185,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"outlook_get_user_photo",
"outlook_get_unread",
"outlook_save_attachment"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"outlook_send_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "outlook_login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_logout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_respond_to_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_search_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_schedule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_find_meeting_times",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_cancel_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_forward_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_delete_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_search_people",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_availability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_manager",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_direct_reports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_user_photo",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_automatic_replies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_set_automatic_replies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_unread",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_send_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_reply_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_forward_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_mark_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_flag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_move_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_delete_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_update_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_add_attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_list_attachments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_save_attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_get_conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_set_categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_rename_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "outlook_delete_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a20d27d823192eb0753531dbc798bd4b5439d78840baba3fd481d955beffccd1",
"stats": {
"tools": 53,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}