Msoutlook MCP Server
msoutlook-mcp
npm
v0.4.2
Source verified
Published by shayanline — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Microsoft Outlook web. No app registration required, uses your existing Outlook session.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 10 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/browser-login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browser-login.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; import { OWA_URL, LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/browser-login.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/browser/cookie-import.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/cookie-import.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; // ────────────────────────────────
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/cookie-import.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([outlook_get_user_photo, outlook_get_unread, outlook_save_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([outlook_send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [outlook_get_user_photo, outlook_get_unread, outlook_save_attachment] → sinks [outlook_send_email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow outlook_get_user_photo → outlook_send_email
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auth/browser-login.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/browser-login.js:68`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ); const json = execSync(`plutil -convert json -o - "${plistPath}"`, { encoding: 'utf8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/browser-login.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/browser/cookie-import.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/cookie-import.js:185`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const password = execSync(`security find-generic-password -s "${keychainService}" -w`, { encoding: 'utf8', timeou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/cookie-import.js
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
outlook_get_unreadingests untrusted inputoutlook_get_user_photoingests untrusted inputoutlook_save_attachmentingests untrusted inputoutlook_send_emailnetwork egressoutlook_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilityoutlook_batchno sensitive capabilityoutlook_cancel_eventno sensitive capabilityoutlook_create_contactno sensitive capabilityoutlook_create_draftno sensitive capabilityoutlook_create_eventno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
outlook_create_folderno sensitive capabilityoutlook_create_forward_draftno sensitive capabilityoutlook_create_reply_draftno sensitive capabilityoutlook_delete_contactno sensitive capabilityoutlook_delete_emailno sensitive capabilityoutlook_delete_eventno sensitive capabilityoutlook_delete_folderno sensitive capabilityoutlook_find_meeting_timesno sensitive capabilityoutlook_flagno sensitive capabilityoutlook_forwardno sensitive capabilityoutlook_forward_eventno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_automatic_repliesno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_availabilityno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_contactno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_conversationno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_direct_reportsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_emailno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_eventno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_managerno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_scheduleno sensitive capabilityoutlook_get_user_profileno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_calendarsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_contactsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_emailsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_eventsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_list_foldersno sensitive capabilityoutlook_loginno sensitive capabilityoutlook_logoutno sensitive capabilityoutlook_mark_readno sensitive capabilityoutlook_move_emailno sensitive capabilityoutlook_rename_folderno sensitive capabilityoutlook_replyno sensitive capabilityoutlook_respond_to_eventno sensitive capabilityoutlook_search_emailsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_search_eventsno sensitive capabilityoutlook_search_peopleno sensitive capabilityoutlook_send_draftno sensitive capabilityoutlook_set_automatic_repliesno sensitive capabilityoutlook_set_categoriesno sensitive capabilityoutlook_statusno sensitive capabilityoutlook_update_draftno sensitive capabilityoutlook_update_eventno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.2 latest |
B 81/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.1 |
B 81/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.4.0 |
B 81/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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