Ms Teams — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ms-teams-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ms-teams-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "ms-teams-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_unread_summary → read_channel_file → forward_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_unread_summary → read_channel_file → forward_email"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"read_email",
"get_unread_summary"
],
"sources": [
"read_channel_file"
],
"sinks": [
"send_email",
"forward_email"
],
"path": [
"get_unread_summary",
"read_channel_file",
"forward_email"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_unread_summary",
"to": "read_channel_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "read_channel_file",
"to": "forward_email",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (ms_teams_mcp/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`ms_teams_mcp/server.py:266`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "ms_teams_mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "ip result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pip\", \"install\", \"--upgrade\", \"ms-teams-",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "ms_teams_mcp/server.py",
"line": 266,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (ms_teams_mcp/server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`ms_teams_mcp/server.py:243`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "ms_teams_mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "rom PyPI resp = requests.get( \"https://pypi.org/pypi/ms-teams-mcp/json\", timeout=5,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "ms_teams_mcp/server.py",
"line": 243,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"ms-teams-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "ms-teams-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"ms-teams-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "ms-teams-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"read_email",
"get_unread_summary"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"read_channel_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_email",
"forward_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_unread_summary",
"read_channel_file",
"forward_email"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_unread_summary → read_channel_file → forward_email."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_channel_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_channel_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_channel_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_chats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_chat_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_chat_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_chat_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_chat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forward_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"forward_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_mail_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_calendar_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_calendar_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_calendar_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_calendar_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_recurring_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_channel_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_channel_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "build_file_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_file_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_unread_summary",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "check_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "authenticate_complete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1593dd59a2cd16e8f06d58f80f8e162e606516490139023061c77b8fc7e34a49",
"stats": {
"tools": 33,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 2
}
}
}