Ms Teams (PyPI) MCP Server
ms-teams-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Microsoft Teams & Outlook MCP Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 12 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_unread_summary → read_channel_file → forward_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_unread_summary → read_channel_file → forward_email
high Shell/command execution in server code (ms_teams_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ms_teams_mcp/server.py:266`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ip result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--upgrade", "ms-teams-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ms_teams_mcp/server.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (ms_teams_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`ms_teams_mcp/server.py:243`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rom PyPI resp = requests.get( "https://pypi.org/pypi/ms-teams-mcp/json", timeout=5,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ms_teams_mcp/server.py
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
forward_emailnetwork egressget_unread_summaryingests untrusted inputread_channel_filereads sensitive dataread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressauth_statusno sensitive capabilityauthenticateno sensitive capabilityauthenticate_completeno sensitive capabilitybuild_file_indexno sensitive capabilitycheck_updateno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
create_calendar_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_chatno sensitive capabilitycreate_recurring_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_calendar_eventno sensitive capabilitylist_calendar_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_channel_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_channel_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_chat_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_chatsno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_mail_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilityreply_emailno sensitive capabilityreply_to_channel_messageno sensitive capabilityreply_to_chat_messageno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_file_indexno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilitysend_channel_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_chat_messageno sensitive capabilityupdate_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
B 88/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ms-teams-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Ms Teams 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
More in Business & CRM
Free public tax reference data — GST/VAT, income, company and capital-gains tax rules for 50+ countries.
The approval gate for unattended UCP buying agents — a policy/approval MCP proxy in front of a merchant's UCP checkout endpoint.
Autotask PSA MCP server. Generic entity query/get/create/update across the full REST API plus convenience tools for tickets, companies, contacts, projects, tasks and time entries. AI-safe with readonly mode and destructive-action confirmation. stdio + opt
MCP server for B2C Commerce developer experience tools
Search, compare and contact real-world companies through a public MCP business directory.
Norwegian business register (Brønnøysundregistrene) as an MCP server — companies, roles, subunits and annual accounts, with the register's silent traps encoded as guards.