Mokomonitor — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor"
},
"server": {
"name": "@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 80,
"threatScore": 88,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.66,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/client.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/client.js"
},
"evidence": "execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/client.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (source/client.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`source/client.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "source/client.ts"
},
"evidence": "execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import type { MonitorConnection } from '.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "source/client.ts",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/client.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/client.js:32`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/client.js"
},
"evidence": "m'; return this.exec(`ps aux --sort=${sort} | head -${count + 1}`); } async serviceStatus(service) {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/client.js",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:150`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "t clientFor(connection).exec(`grep \"Failed password\" /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | tail -${lines ?? 20}`))); server.to",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 150,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (source/client.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`source/client.ts:39`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "source/client.ts"
},
"evidence": "'-pmem'; return this.exec(`ps aux --sort=${sort} | head -${count + 1}`); } async serviceStatus(service: string): P",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "source/client.ts",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (source/index.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`source/index.ts:193`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "source/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "t clientFor(connection).exec( `grep \"Failed password\" /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | tail -${lines ?? 20}`))); server",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "source/index.ts",
"line": 193,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "monitor_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_disk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_processes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_uptime",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_list_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_dashboards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_dashboard_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_datasources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_alerts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_alert_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grafana_annotations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_sites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_site_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_site_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_docker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_docker_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_failed_logins",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_cron",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_reboot_required",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_updates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_journal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_waas_heartbeats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_docker_containers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_prometheus_targets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_nginx_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_ntfy_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b95a2cc90f5240d6198ba10dcb2e5b8374322d607e47aef9725ea76f08d5e026",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 4,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}