Mokomonitor MCP Server
@mokoconsulting/mcp-mokomonitor
npm
v1.4.0
Published by @mokoconsulting — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for server health monitoring, uptime, and log tailing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 8 = 80. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/client.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (source/client.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`source/client.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import type { MonitorConnection } from '.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server source/client.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/client.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/client.js:32`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: m'; return this.exec(`ps aux --sort=${sort} | head -${count + 1}`); } async serviceStatus(service) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:150`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t clientFor(connection).exec(`grep "Failed password" /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | tail -${lines ?? 20}`))); server.to
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (source/client.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`source/client.ts:39`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '-pmem'; return this.exec(`ps aux --sort=${sort} | head -${count + 1}`); } async serviceStatus(service: string): P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server source/client.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (source/index.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`source/index.ts:193`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t clientFor(connection).exec( `grep "Failed password" /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null | tail -${lines ?? 20}`))); server
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server source/index.ts
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
grafana_alert_rulesno sensitive capabilitygrafana_alertsno sensitive capabilitygrafana_annotationsno sensitive capabilitygrafana_dashboard_getno sensitive capabilitygrafana_dashboardsno sensitive capabilitygrafana_datasourcesno sensitive capabilitygrafana_healthno sensitive capabilitygrafana_queryno sensitive capabilitymonitor_cronno sensitive capabilitymonitor_diskno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
monitor_dockerno sensitive capabilitymonitor_docker_containersno sensitive capabilitymonitor_docker_statsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_failed_loginsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_healthno sensitive capabilitymonitor_journalno sensitive capabilitymonitor_list_serversno sensitive capabilitymonitor_logsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_memoryno sensitive capabilitymonitor_networkno sensitive capabilitymonitor_nginx_statusno sensitive capabilitymonitor_ntfy_statusno sensitive capabilitymonitor_processesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_prometheus_targetsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_reboot_requiredno sensitive capabilitymonitor_serviceno sensitive capabilitymonitor_site_addno sensitive capabilitymonitor_site_removeno sensitive capabilitymonitor_sitesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_updatesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_uptimeno sensitive capabilitymonitor_waas_heartbeatsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
B 80/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.0 |
B 80/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v1.0.3 |
B 80/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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