Mnotify MCP Server
mnotify-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.1.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MNotify MCP server: expose MNotify SMS tools over the Model Context Protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_contact_details, get_group_details, get_message_template]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_quick_bulk_sms, send_bulk_group_sms, update_scheduled_sms, sms_delivery_report, specific_sms_delivery_report, periodic_sms_delivery_report]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_contact_details, get_group_details, get_message_template] → sinks [send_quick_bulk_sms, send_bulk_group_sms, update_scheduled_sms, sms_delivery_r
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_contact_details → send_quick_bulk_sms
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_contact_detailsingests untrusted inputget_group_detailsingests untrusted inputget_message_templateingests untrusted inputperiodic_sms_delivery_reportnetwork egresssend_bulk_group_smsnetwork egresssend_quick_bulk_smsnetwork egresssms_delivery_reportnetwork egressspecific_sms_delivery_reportnetwork egressupdate_scheduled_smsnetwork egressadd_contactno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
add_groupno sensitive capabilityadd_message_templateno sensitive capabilitycheck_sender_idno sensitive capabilitycheck_sms_balance_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_groupno sensitive capabilitydelete_message_templateno sensitive capabilityget_contact_listno sensitive capabilityget_context_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_group_contactsno sensitive capabilityget_group_list_toolno sensitive capabilityget_template_list_toolno sensitive capabilityregister_sender_idno sensitive capabilityresolve_group_nameno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_groupno sensitive capabilityupdate_message_templateno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mnotify-mcp-server --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
Adapters for the FrontMCP framework
Transcend MCP Server — Admin tools.
Transcend MCP Server — Assessments tools.
MCP Server for Bling
MCP Server for Blogger API
Official MCP server for Brilliant Directories — manage members, posts, leads, reviews, and more.