Miot MCP Server
miot-mcp
PyPI
v2.0.0
Published by javen-yan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Mijia smart device MCP server, providing device discovery, property read/write, action invoke and other functions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (adapter/mijia_adapter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`adapter/mijia_adapter.py:126`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n": subprocess.Popen(["open", str(path)]) _LOGGER.info("Opened QR artifact with
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server adapter/mijia_adapter.py
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
clear_saved_loginno sensitive capabilitycontrol_by_intentno sensitive capabilitycontrol_deviceno sensitive capabilityexecute_sceneno sensitive capabilityget_consumable_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_deviceno sensitive capabilityget_device_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_device_statusno sensitive capabilityget_home_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_service_statusno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
get_tool_catalogno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_homesno sensitive capabilitylist_scenesno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityprepare_loginno sensitive capabilityreconnect_serviceno sensitive capabilityrefresh_devicesno sensitive capabilityset_brightnessno sensitive capabilityset_color_temperatureno sensitive capabilityset_cover_positionno sensitive capabilityset_fan_speedno sensitive capabilityset_hvac_modeno sensitive capabilityset_target_temperatureno sensitive capabilityturn_off_deviceno sensitive capabilityturn_on_deviceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan miot-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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