Mindkeg — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mindkeg-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mindkeg-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "mindkeg-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:7093`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\"; import { homedir as homedir2 } from \"os\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 7093,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:2107`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings\", { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 2107,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/index.js:1216`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings\", { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/services/index.js",
"line": 1216,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:7317`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "n32\") { try { execSync(`chmod +x \"${hookPath}\"`, { stdio: [\"pipe\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"] }); } catch { } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 7317,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_scopes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_learning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_learning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deprecate_learning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_learning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_repositories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "flag_stale",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_workspaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "relate_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supersede_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_open_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "store_gotcha",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_gotchas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_run_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_relevant_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f238a86f7f88d693393c7a8037d22e5b6ecf6d89b2dfa0bac5ccbdc6e2b6c1dc",
"stats": {
"tools": 27,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}