Dadata (metarebalance) MCP Server
@metarebalance/dadata-mcp
npm
v1.0.6
Published by @metarebalance — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Full-featured MCP server for DaData.ru — Russian address validation, company lookup, phone cleaning, geocoding for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/clean.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/clean.js:233`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://cleaner.dadata.ru/api/v1/clean", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/clean.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
clean_addressno sensitive capabilityclean_emailno sensitive capabilityclean_nameno sensitive capabilityclean_passportno sensitive capabilityclean_personno sensitive capabilityclean_phoneno sensitive capabilityclean_vehicleno sensitive capabilityfind_affiliatedno sensitive capabilityfind_bankno sensitive capabilityfind_brandno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
find_by_id_addressno sensitive capabilityfind_company_by_emailno sensitive capabilityfind_company_by_idno sensitive capabilityfind_delivery_cityno sensitive capabilityfind_fms_unitno sensitive capabilityfind_inn_by_passportno sensitive capabilityfind_postal_unitno sensitive capabilityfind_self_employedno sensitive capabilitygeolocate_addressno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_versionsno sensitive capabilityip_locateno sensitive capabilitylookup_referenceno sensitive capabilitysuggest_addressno sensitive capabilitysuggest_car_brandno sensitive capabilitysuggest_companyno sensitive capabilitysuggest_company_byno sensitive capabilitysuggest_company_kzno sensitive capabilitysuggest_countryno sensitive capabilitysuggest_emailno sensitive capabilitysuggest_fiono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.6 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @metarebalance/dadata-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Dadata 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
More in API Development
Adapters for the FrontMCP framework
Transcend MCP Server — Admin tools.
Transcend MCP Server — Assessments tools.
MCP Server for Bling
MCP Server for Blogger API
Official MCP server for Brilliant Directories — manage members, posts, leads, reviews, and more.