Memnant MCP Server
memnant
npm
v1.22.0
Published by peureka — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
It just remembers.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Tool "memnant_eval_persona" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "memnant_eval_persona" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool memnant_eval_persona
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid'; import { createInterface } from 'readline';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/lint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/lint.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; const SOURCE_EXTENSIONS = new Set([ '.ts', '.tsx', '.js', '.jsx', '.vue', '.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/lint.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/doctor/diagnose.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/doctor/diagnose.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { VERSION } from '../version.js'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/doctor/diagnose.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/doctor/repair.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/doctor/repair.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { loadConfig } from '../config/load.js'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/doctor/repair.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/snapshot/scanner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/snapshot/scanner.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'fs'; import { j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/snapshot/scanner.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/update-check.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/update-check.js:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/memnant/latest', { signal: controller.signal,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/update-check.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/governor/plugins.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/governor/plugins.js:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(fileUrl); const validator = mod.default; if (!validator || typeof
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/governor/plugins.js
low Mutating tool "memnant_eval_persona" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memnant_eval_persona" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memnant_eval_persona
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import * as TOML from 'smol-toml'; import { claude
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memnant_eval_personaruns code / shellmemnant_analyticsno sensitive capabilitymemnant_check_copyno sensitive capabilitymemnant_check_designno sensitive capabilitymemnant_context_for_fileno sensitive capabilitymemnant_costsno sensitive capabilitymemnant_federated_recallno sensitive capabilitymemnant_harvest_memoryno sensitive capabilitymemnant_historyno sensitive capabilitymemnant_logno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
memnant_project_briefno sensitive capabilitymemnant_recallno sensitive capabilitymemnant_reindexno sensitive capabilitymemnant_replayno sensitive capabilitymemnant_retractno sensitive capabilitymemnant_session_closeno sensitive capabilitymemnant_session_contextno sensitive capabilitymemnant_session_logno sensitive capabilitymemnant_spec_diffno sensitive capabilitymemnant_statsno sensitive capabilitymemnant_statusno sensitive capabilitymemnant_synthesiseno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.22.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v1.19.0 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.18.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.18.0 |
B 89/100 | 12 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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