Memlab MCP Server
@memlab/mcp-server
npm
v2.86.0
Published by @memlab — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for MemLab heap snapshot analysis — gives AI coding assistants tools to explore JavaScript heap snapshots, find memory leaks, and identify optimization opportunities
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "memlab_eval_across" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "memlab_eval_across" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool memlab_eval_across
high Tool "memlab_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "memlab_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool memlab_eval
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/eval.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/eval.js:2580`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ined_size` THROW inside eval (they read back ~0 on some loads). Use `helpers.retainedSize(id)` / `helpers.retainedSizes(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/eval.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/hypothesis.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/hypothesis.js:106`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tests.push(vm.runInNewContext(`(function(node){ return !!(${spec.predicate}); })`, Object.create(null), { t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/hypothesis.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/memlab-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/memlab-cli.js:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import {spawn} from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import {fileURLToPath} from 'url';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/memlab-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/load-snapshot.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/load-snapshot.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { z } from 'zod'; import memlabCore from '@memlab/core'; import memlabHea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/load-snapshot.js
low Mutating tool "memlab_eval_across" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memlab_eval_across" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memlab_eval_across
low Mutating tool "memlab_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memlab_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memlab_eval
Tools 102
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memlab_evalruns code / shellmemlab_eval_acrossruns code / shellmemlab_aggregateno sensitive capabilitymemlab_analyze_runno sensitive capabilitymemlab_anonymize_snapshotno sensitive capabilitymemlab_app_configno sensitive capabilitymemlab_app_heapno sensitive capabilitymemlab_array_group_byno sensitive capabilitymemlab_artifact_budgetno sensitive capabilitymemlab_async_censusno sensitive capability
Show 92 more tools ↓
memlab_auto_investigateno sensitive capabilitymemlab_batchno sensitive capabilitymemlab_cache_analysisno sensitive capabilitymemlab_census_diffno sensitive capabilitymemlab_chain_walkno sensitive capabilitymemlab_check_healthno sensitive capabilitymemlab_class_histogramno sensitive capabilitymemlab_closure_inspectionno sensitive capabilitymemlab_collection_diffno sensitive capabilitymemlab_collection_trendno sensitive capabilitymemlab_detached_domno sensitive capabilitymemlab_dev_artifactsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_diff_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_dom_auditno sensitive capabilitymemlab_dominator_attributionno sensitive capabilitymemlab_dominator_chainno sensitive capabilitymemlab_dominator_subtreeno sensitive capabilitymemlab_duplicate_objectsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_duplicated_stringsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_event_listener_leaksno sensitive capabilitymemlab_event_registryno sensitive capabilitymemlab_explain_deltano sensitive capabilitymemlab_find_by_propertyno sensitive capabilitymemlab_find_by_shapeno sensitive capabilitymemlab_find_nodes_by_classno sensitive capabilitymemlab_finding_indexno sensitive capabilitymemlab_for_eachno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_nodeno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_propertyno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_referencesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_referrersno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_stringno sensitive capabilitymemlab_get_valueno sensitive capabilitymemlab_global_variablesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_growth_signalsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_hunt_reportno sensitive capabilitymemlab_hypothesisno sensitive capabilitymemlab_id_space_auditno sensitive capabilitymemlab_identifyno sensitive capabilitymemlab_identity_diffno sensitive capabilitymemlab_intern_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_ladderno sensitive capabilitymemlab_ladder_probeno sensitive capabilitymemlab_largest_objectsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_leak_reportno sensitive capabilitymemlab_load_snapshotno sensitive capabilitymemlab_map_entriesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_match_objectno sensitive capabilitymemlab_metricno sensitive capabilitymemlab_module_attributionno sensitive capabilitymemlab_next_measurementno sensitive capabilitymemlab_object_cost_breakdownno sensitive capabilitymemlab_object_shapeno sensitive capabilitymemlab_pinch_pointsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_population_diffno sensitive capabilitymemlab_population_vs_ownersno sensitive capabilitymemlab_property_distributionno sensitive capabilitymemlab_property_namesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_quick_diagnosisno sensitive capabilitymemlab_react_ownersno sensitive capabilitymemlab_react_update_queuesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_referrer_summaryno sensitive capabilitymemlab_replicateno sensitive capabilitymemlab_reportsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_retainer_diffno sensitive capabilitymemlab_retainer_layersno sensitive capabilitymemlab_retainer_summaryno sensitive capabilitymemlab_retainer_traceno sensitive capabilitymemlab_round_auditno sensitive capabilitymemlab_round_digestno sensitive capabilitymemlab_script_censusno sensitive capabilitymemlab_search_nodesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_search_stringsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_sequence_analysisno sensitive capabilitymemlab_server_statusno sensitive capabilitymemlab_settle_checkno sensitive capabilitymemlab_shape_histogramno sensitive capabilitymemlab_sliced_stringsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_snapshot_headerno sensitive capabilitymemlab_snapshot_summaryno sensitive capabilitymemlab_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_sparse_elementsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_stale_collectionsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_string_patternsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_toolsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_trace_allno sensitive capabilitymemlab_trace_dominatorsno sensitive capabilitymemlab_unit_costno sensitive capabilitymemlab_verify_fixno sensitive capabilitymemlab_weakmap_entriesno sensitive capabilitymemlab_weakref_censusno sensitive capabilitymemlab_what_ifno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (102 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.86.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.52.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v2.18.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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