Memgrep — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "memgrep",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "memgrep"
},
"server": {
"name": "memgrep"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (64 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/loop/git.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/loop/git.js:17`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/loop/git.js"
},
"evidence": "redentials.*|.*secret.*|id_rsa.*|.*\\.(?:pem|p12|pfx|key))$/i; const ENV_EXAMPLE_RE = /(?:^|\\/)\\.env(?:\\..+)?\\.example$/i",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/loop/git.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/swe1/git.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/swe1/git.js:17`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/swe1/git.js"
},
"evidence": "redentials.*|.*secret.*|id_rsa.*|.*\\.(?:pem|p12|pfx|key))$/i; const ENV_EXAMPLE_RE = /(?:^|\\/)\\.env(?:\\..+)?\\.example$/i",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/swe1/git.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/clipboard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/clipboard.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/clipboard.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; function clipboardCommand() { switch (pl",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/clipboard.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/edge/launchd.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/edge/launchd.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/edge/launchd.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { defaultHome } from '../memory/store.js'; import { buildLaunchdPlist, la",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/edge/launchd.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/edge/local-tools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/edge/local-tools.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/edge/local-tools.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; const TOOL_DESCRIPTIONS = { edge_ping: 'Ping t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/edge/local-tools.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/edge/service.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/edge/service.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/edge/service.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { defaultHome } from '../memory/store.js'; import { resolveMemgrepProgram",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/edge/service.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ingest/launchd.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ingest/launchd.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ingest/launchd.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { defaultHome } from '../memory/store.js'; import { buildLaunchdPlist, la",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ingest/launchd.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/jobs/launchd.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/jobs/launchd.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/jobs/launchd.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { defaultHome } from '../memory/store.js'; import { buildLaunchdPlist, la",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/jobs/launchd.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/loop/background.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/loop/background.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/loop/background.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { closeSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/loop/background.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/loop/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/loop/git.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/loop/git.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { createPullRequest, defaultGhRunn",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/loop/git.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/loop/pr.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/loop/pr.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/loop/pr.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/loop/pr.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_chat, jira_get_issue, ph_get_post, neon_connection_uri]) co-exist with external-action tools ([jira_create_issue]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_chat → jira_create_issue"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get_chat, jira_get_issue, ph_get_post, neon_connection_uri] → sinks [jira_create_issue]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_chat",
"jira_get_issue",
"ph_get_post",
"neon_connection_uri"
],
"sinks": [
"jira_create_issue"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/docs/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/docs/pdf.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/docs/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, } from 'node:fs'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/docs/pdf.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_chat",
"jira_get_issue",
"ph_get_post",
"neon_connection_uri"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"jira_create_issue"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_chat",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_chats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edge_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edge_ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edge_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edge_loop_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edge_cursor_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobs_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jira_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jira_get_issue",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "jira_create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "jira_add_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jira_transition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jira_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ph_today",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ph_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ph_get_post",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ph_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "posthog_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "posthog_top_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "posthog_feature_flags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "posthog_get_flag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "neon_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "neon_get_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "neon_list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "neon_connection_uri",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gcloud_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gcloud_logs_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gcloud_list_instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gcloud_get_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_del",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_dbsize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_ttl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upstash_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cursor_workspaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cursor_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cursor_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_run_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_upsert_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_remove_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_upsert_exit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_remove_exit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_upsert_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loop_remove_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_list_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_fill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_serve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f067f39addf99e671ddf5e5ef12d98023ca1e6c284a215477c929c85bbaccf30",
"stats": {
"tools": 64,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}