Mega — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mega-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mega-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "mega-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 85,
"threatScore": 96,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 3.6,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-005",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 3.6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: mega_get → mega_ls → mega_put. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "mega_get → mega_ls → mega_put"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"mega_get"
],
"sources": [
"mega_ls"
],
"sinks": [
"mega_put"
],
"path": [
"mega_get",
"mega_ls",
"mega_put"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "mega_get",
"to": "mega_ls",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "mega_ls",
"to": "mega_put",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const MEGA_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const MEG",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-005",
"title": "Near-miss of exa-mcp-server (edit distance 2)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"mega-mcp-server\" is edit-distance 2 from the package \"exa-mcp-server\". Verify this is the intended package.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"exa-mcp-server\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "mega-mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "mega-mcp-server",
"target": "exa-mcp-server"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"mega_ls\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"mega_ls\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "mega_ls",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"mega_get"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"mega_ls"
],
"externalSink": [
"mega_put"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"mega_get",
"mega_ls",
"mega_put"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: mega_get → mega_ls → mega_put."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "mega_whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_ls",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mega_cd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_pwd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_mkdir",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_rm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_mv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_cp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mega_put",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mega_df",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_du",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_transfers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_sync",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_cat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mega_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a416b4a2f2d424652f2fe671ff4e0b9f92d05dcddcc9745446a2ec02b1af9782",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}