Mega MCP Server
mega-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.1
Published by expertvagabond — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for MEGA cloud storage CLI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 3.6 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −3.6 | Near-miss of exa-mcp-server MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 11 = 85. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: mega_get → mega_ls → mega_put. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow mega_get → mega_ls → mega_put
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const MEGA_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const MEG
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
medium Near-miss of exa-mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"mega-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the package "exa-mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "exa-mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package mega-mcp-server
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "mega_ls"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "mega_ls" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool mega_ls · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mega_getingests untrusted inputmega_lsreads sensitive datamega_putnetwork egressmega_catno sensitive capabilitymega_cdno sensitive capabilitymega_cpno sensitive capabilitymega_dfno sensitive capabilitymega_duno sensitive capabilitymega_exportno sensitive capabilitymega_findno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
mega_importno sensitive capabilitymega_mkdirno sensitive capabilitymega_mvno sensitive capabilitymega_pwdno sensitive capabilitymega_rmno sensitive capabilitymega_shareno sensitive capabilitymega_syncno sensitive capabilitymega_transfersno sensitive capabilitymega_treeno sensitive capabilitymega_whoamino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
B 85/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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