Wordpress — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-wordpress",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-wordpress"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-wordpress"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/security/AISecurityScanner.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/AISecurityScanner.js:538`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/AISecurityScanner.js"
},
"evidence": "vate.key\", \"id_rsa\", ]; for (const fileName of sensitiveFiles) { try {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/security/AISecurityScanner.js",
"line": 538,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js:445`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js"
},
"evidence": "ve.push(\"Uses dangerous eval() function\"); if (/innerHTML.*\\+/g.test(content)) negative.push(\"Potent",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js",
"line": 445,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/status.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/status.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/status.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import dotenv from \"dotenv\"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/status.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js"
},
"evidence": "vulnerable: `exec(\"ls \" + userInput);`, secure: `execFile(\"ls\", [userInput]);`, }, },",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security/SecurityReviewer.js",
"line": 102,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/version.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/version.js:65`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/version.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.github.com/repos/docdyhr/mcp-wordpress/releases/latest\", { header",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/tools/version.js",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/status.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/status.js:297`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/status.js"
},
"evidence": "const module = await import(modulePath); const toolNames = Object.keys(module).filter( (name) =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "bin/status.js",
"line": 297,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/setup.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { Writable } from \"stream\"; import open from \"open\"; const __filename =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/setup.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "seo_client",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_operations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_analyze_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_generate_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_bulk_update_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_generate_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_validate_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_suggest_internal_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_site_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_track_serp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_keyword_research",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_test_integration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_get_live_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "seo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_generate_meta",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_bulk_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wp_seo_internal_linking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content_analyzer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "seo_analyze_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "site_auditor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meta_generator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "seo_generate_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schema_generator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "internal_linking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "136bd4510220518b661ae52a982b6854a6f96856ba825021a0c3690a15e21fdd",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}