Vibedeploy — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://mcp.vibedeploy.be/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://mcp.vibedeploy.be/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vibedeploy",
"version": "1.0.1"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: deploy_from_url → read_file ⇒ add_file_chunk. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "deploy_from_url → read_file → add_file_chunk"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"read_source_file",
"deploy_from_url",
"rehost_images"
],
"sources": [
"read_file",
"read_files",
"read_source_file"
],
"sinks": [
"add_file_chunk"
],
"path": [
"deploy_from_url",
"read_file",
"add_file_chunk"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "deploy_from_url",
"to": "read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "read_file",
"to": "add_file_chunk",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_source_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_source_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_source_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint mcp.vibedeploy.be. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"read_source_file",
"deploy_from_url",
"rehost_images"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"read_file",
"read_files",
"read_source_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"add_file_chunk"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"deploy_from_url",
"read_file",
"add_file_chunk"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: deploy_from_url → read_file ⇒ add_file_chunk."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_site",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_site_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_file_hashes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_source_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_source_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_source_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "write_source_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_source_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_and_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_from_url",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rehost_images",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_file_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_edits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_forms_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_forms_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_forms_sender_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_custom_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_custom_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_custom_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_custom_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dns_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_domain_availability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "begin_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_file_chunk",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_post\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "commit_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "abort_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_deploys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_snapshots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "aa0f4767e28fa13a25720251cd3f81538e98eaa416a68dc0dfd4ee00ee27f7b9",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}