Vibedeploy MCP Server
https://mcp.vibedeploy.be/mcp
Remote
v1.0.1
Published by mcp.vibedeploy.be — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Deploy and host AI-built websites on EU infrastructure, straight from your AI agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: deploy_from_url → read_file ⇒ add_file_chunk. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow deploy_from_url → read_file → add_file_chunk
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "read_source_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_source_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_source_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
read_source_fileingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataadd_file_chunknetwork egressdeploy_from_urlingests untrusted inputread_filereads sensitive dataread_filesreads sensitive datarehost_imagesingests untrusted inputabort_deployno sensitive capabilityadd_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityadd_filesno sensitive capabilityapply_editsno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
begin_deployno sensitive capabilitybuild_and_deployno sensitive capabilitycheck_domain_availabilityno sensitive capabilitycommit_deployno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydelete_siteno sensitive capabilitydelete_source_fileno sensitive capabilitydeploy_siteno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_forms_configno sensitive capabilityget_siteno sensitive capabilityget_site_analyticsno sensitive capabilitylist_custom_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_deploysno sensitive capabilitylist_dns_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_file_hashesno sensitive capabilitylist_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_sitesno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitylist_source_filesno sensitive capabilityread_source_filesno sensitive capabilityremove_custom_domainno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilityset_forms_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_file_contentno sensitive capabilityupdate_siteno sensitive capabilityverify_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityverify_forms_sender_domainno sensitive capabilitywrite_source_filesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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