Switch — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://mcp.switchapp.ai/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://mcp.switchapp.ai/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "switch",
"version": "0.1.0"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 79,
"threatScore": 85,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1",
"title": "Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the instructions of server. Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"field": "instructions"
},
"evidence": "never tell the user",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "secrecy"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"talking_avatar_video\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"talking_avatar_video\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "talking_avatar_video"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([explore_models, show_media, create_depth_map, get_depth_map_status, get_vision_report]) co-exist with external-action tools ([talking_avatar_video]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "explore_models → talking_avatar_video"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [explore_models, show_media, create_depth_map, get_depth_map_status, get_vision_report] → sinks [talking_avatar_video]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"explore_models",
"show_media",
"create_depth_map",
"get_depth_map_status",
"get_vision_report"
],
"sinks": [
"talking_avatar_video"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"video_url\" on \"create_depth_map\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_depth_map\" takes a URL/host parameter \"video_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_depth_map",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.video_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "video_url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"talking_avatar_video\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"talking_avatar_video\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "talking_avatar_video",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"talking_avatar_video\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"talking_avatar_video\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "talking_avatar_video"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint mcp.switchapp.ai. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"explore_models",
"show_media",
"create_depth_map",
"get_depth_map_status",
"get_vision_report"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"talking_avatar_video"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "explore_models",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "check_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_generations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_generation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_job_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_media",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_assets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_my_library",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_active_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_iphone_realism",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_movie_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_high_fashion_editorial",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_graphic_editorial_portrait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_travel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_wellness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_cinematic_anamorphic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_magic_hour_portrait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_product",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_ugc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_my_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_video",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_video_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_video_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_videos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lip_sync_video",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "talking_avatar_video",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "voice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_audio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_reference_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stitch_videos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_video",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_depth_map",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_depth_map_status",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_video_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_vision_report",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_vision_reports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "video_to_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_media",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "302f43f1f1c8923ddb6d20b78461425c6372370e0604a53cbe09d339875e2a89",
"stats": {
"tools": 40,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 1,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}