Switch MCP Server
https://mcp.switchapp.ai/mcp
Remote
v0.1.0
Published by mcp.switchapp.ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Generate, manage and explore your Switch AI image and video library, scoped to your account.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Secrecy directive MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 6 = 79. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1
Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the instructions of server. Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: never tell the user
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
high Tool "talking_avatar_video" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "talking_avatar_video" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool talking_avatar_video
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([explore_models, show_media, create_depth_map, get_depth_map_status, get_vision_report]) co-exist with external-action tools ([talking_avatar_video]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [explore_models, show_media, create_depth_map, get_depth_map_status, get_vision_report] → sinks [talking_avatar_video]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow explore_models → talking_avatar_video
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "video_url" on "create_depth_map"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_depth_map" takes a URL/host parameter "video_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_depth_map · inputSchema.properties.video_url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "talking_avatar_video"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "talking_avatar_video" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool talking_avatar_video · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "talking_avatar_video" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "talking_avatar_video" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool talking_avatar_video
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
create_depth_mapingests untrusted inputexplore_modelsingests untrusted inputget_depth_map_statusingests untrusted inputget_vision_reportingests untrusted inputshow_mediaingests untrusted inputtalking_avatar_videoruns code / shellanalyze_videono sensitive capabilityanalyze_video_reportno sensitive capabilityapply_cinematic_anamorphicno sensitive capabilityapply_graphic_editorial_portraitno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
apply_high_fashion_editorialno sensitive capabilityapply_iphone_realismno sensitive capabilityapply_magic_hour_portraitno sensitive capabilityapply_movie_sceneno sensitive capabilityapply_productno sensitive capabilityapply_travelno sensitive capabilityapply_ugcno sensitive capabilityapply_wellnessno sensitive capabilitycancel_my_taskno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilitycheck_job_statusno sensitive capabilitygenerate_audiono sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_videono sensitive capabilityget_my_active_referencesno sensitive capabilityget_video_statusno sensitive capabilitylip_sync_videono sensitive capabilitylist_generationsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_my_videosno sensitive capabilitylist_video_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_vision_reportsno sensitive capabilitysearch_my_libraryno sensitive capabilityshow_generationno sensitive capabilitystitch_videosno sensitive capabilityupload_mediano sensitive capabilityupload_reference_assetno sensitive capabilityvideo_to_promptno sensitive capabilityvoiceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
C 79/100 | 6 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-24 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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