Tree Sitter (wrale) MCP Server
mcp-server-tree-sitter
PyPI
v0.7.0
Published by wrale — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for Tree-sitter code analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_arguments.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_arguments.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: al command result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_server_tree_sitter", "--help"], capt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli_arguments.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_makefile_targets.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_makefile_targets.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: there result = subprocess.run( ["make", "mcp-run", "ARGS=--help"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_makefile_targets.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_smoke.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cleanly.""" proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_server_tree_sitter.server", "--help"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_smoke.py
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive dataadapt_queryno sensitive capabilityanalyze_complexityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_projectno sensitive capabilitybuild_queryno sensitive capabilitycheck_language_availableno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilityconfigureno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_configno sensitive capabilityfind_similar_codeno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
find_textno sensitive capabilityfind_usageno sensitive capabilityget_astno sensitive capabilityget_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_fileno sensitive capabilityget_file_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_node_at_positionno sensitive capabilityget_node_typesno sensitive capabilityget_query_template_toolno sensitive capabilityget_symbolsno sensitive capabilitylist_languagesno sensitive capabilitylist_projects_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_query_templates_toolno sensitive capabilityregister_project_toolno sensitive capabilityremove_project_toolno sensitive capabilityrun_queryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-tree-sitter --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Tree Sitter 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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