S3 (ofershap) MCP Server
mcp-server-s3
npm
v1.0.1
Published by ofershap — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AWS S3 — list buckets, browse objects, upload/download files, and generate presigned URLs from your IDE
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Tool "put_object" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "put_object" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "put_object" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool put_object
low Mutating tool "put_object" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "put_object" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool put_object
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_objectingests untrusted inputput_objectwrites filesbucket_infono sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitylist_bucketsno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitypresigned_urlno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-s3 --onlineOther implementations of S3 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
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