S3 (dayongd1) MCP Server

mcp-s3 PyPI v1.1.0

Published by dayongd1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP S3 File Uploader - A Model Context Protocol server for S3 uploads

View on PyPI ↗ Repository ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

93/100

Last scanned 2026-08-25 get badge →

Trust

A · 93/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_file → list_files → upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow download_file → list_files → upload_file

Tools 4

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

download_fileingests untrusted input
list_filesreads sensitive data
upload_filenetwork egress
get_file_infono sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v1.1.0` latest	A 93/100	1	1.13.0	2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

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HTML

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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-s3 --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of S3 5

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →

S3 (ofershap) npm

mcp-server-s3

MCP server for AWS S3 — list buckets, browse objects, upload/download files, and generate presigned URLs from your IDE

Files & Storage Score 96/100 2 findings 90/wk Cap. Moderate

S3 (npm) npm

s3-mcp-server

A Model Context Protocol server that interfaces with S3-compatible storage (like Cloudflare R2).

Files & Storage Score 95/100 2 findings 351/wk Cap. Moderate

Geunoh S3 npm

@geunoh/s3-mcp-server

MCP Server for accessing S3 bucket

Files & Storage Score 95/100 0 findings 165/wk Cap. Moderate

Infoinlet S3 npm

@infoinlet/mcp-s3

Read-only S3 / S3-compatible (MinIO, R2) object storage for AI agents — list buckets, list objects, object metadata, fetch object text. No put/delete. MCP server.

Files & Storage Score 95/100 0 findings 42/wk Cap. Moderate

Afomera S3 npm

@afomera/s3-mcp

MCP server for uploading assets to any S3-compatible bucket (Cloudflare R2, AWS S3, MinIO, etc.)

Developer Tools Score 92/100 3 findings 12/wk Cap. High