Reddit Ads (camlowe) MCP Server
mcp-server-reddit-ads
npm
v0.5.5
Source verified
Published by camlowe — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for the Reddit Ads API v3 - working write operations, tiered safety controls, built-in OAuth setup
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth-command.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth-command.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { homedir } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth-command.js
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_campaigningests untrusted inputcompare_adsno sensitive capabilitycompare_periodsno sensitive capabilitycopy_adsno sensitive capabilitycreate_adno sensitive capabilitycreate_ad_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilityenable_itemsno sensitive capabilityfind_entityno sensitive capabilityget_account_overviewno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
get_accountsno sensitive capabilityget_adno sensitive capabilityget_ad_creativeno sensitive capabilityget_ad_groupno sensitive capabilityget_ad_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_adsno sensitive capabilityget_campaignsno sensitive capabilityget_daily_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_interest_categoriesno sensitive capabilityget_performance_reportno sensitive capabilityget_server_statusno sensitive capabilitypause_itemsno sensitive capabilitysearch_geo_targetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_subredditsno sensitive capabilityupdate_ad_commentsno sensitive capabilityupdate_ad_urlno sensitive capabilityupdate_bidno sensitive capabilityupdate_budgetno sensitive capabilityupdate_nameno sensitive capabilityupdate_targetingno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.5 latest |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.5.2 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-reddit-ads --onlineOther implementations of Reddit Ads 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP server for Reddit Ads API — manage campaigns, targeting, and reporting through the Model Context Protocol
MCP server for Reddit Ads API v3 with campaign, ad group, ad management, and performance reporting.
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