Personal Suite — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-personal-suite",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-personal-suite"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-personal-suite"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js:21`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js"
},
"evidence": "submitResponse = await fetch('https://queue.fal.run/fal-ai/flux-pro/v1.1', { method: 'POST', headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemini-2.0-flash-exp:generateCont",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js:23`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', { method: 'POST', headers:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/engines.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/engines.js:147`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/search/engines.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/${endpoint}/search?${params.toString()}`, { h",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/search/engines.js",
"line": 147,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js:34`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.exa.ai/search', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'x-a",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js",
"line": 34,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js:32`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.tavily.com/search', { method: 'POST', headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/system/health-checks.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/system/health-checks.js:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/modules/system/health-checks.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${config.telegram.botToken}/getMe`); if (response",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/modules/system/health-checks.js",
"line": 63,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:122`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Conte",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cli/setup.js",
"line": 122,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import { randomBytes, createHash } from 'nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/setup.js",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "calendar_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_search_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_check_availability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_upcoming",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_daily_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_mark_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_mark_unread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_edit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "channel_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_receive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_broadcast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "channel_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_web",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"search web\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_news",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_deep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_semantic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_code_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_research",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suite_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suite_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suite_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suite_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suite_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "dc2006edf67913787461c8c8813d52c0a71e30aef6274c42b3974ffff1ca366e",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 7,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}