Personal Suite MCP Server
mcp-personal-suite
npm
v0.5.6
Published by studiomeyer-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first personal productivity MCP server for Claude, Cursor, and any MCP client. Email, Calendar, Messaging, Search, Image Generation. BYOK, no cloud, no signup.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js:21`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: submitResponse = await fetch('https://queue.fal.run/fal-ai/flux-pro/v1.1', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/image/providers/flux.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemini-2.0-flash-exp:generateCont
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/image/providers/gemini.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js:23`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', { method: 'POST', headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/image/providers/openai.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/engines.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/engines.js:147`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/${endpoint}/search?${params.toString()}`, { h
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/search/engines.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js:34`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.exa.ai/search', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'x-a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/search/providers/exa.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js:32`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.tavily.com/search', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/search/providers/tavily.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/modules/system/health-checks.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/modules/system/health-checks.js:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${config.telegram.botToken}/getMe`); if (response
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/modules/system/health-checks.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:122`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import { randomBytes, createHash } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
image_downloadingests untrusted inputsearch_webingests untrusted inputcalendar_check_availabilityno sensitive capabilitycalendar_create_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_daily_summaryno sensitive capabilitycalendar_delete_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_get_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_search_eventsno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
calendar_statusno sensitive capabilitycalendar_upcomingno sensitive capabilitycalendar_update_eventno sensitive capabilitychannel_broadcastno sensitive capabilitychannel_connectno sensitive capabilitychannel_disconnectno sensitive capabilitychannel_historyno sensitive capabilitychannel_listno sensitive capabilitychannel_receiveno sensitive capabilitychannel_sendno sensitive capabilitychannel_statusno sensitive capabilityemail_authno sensitive capabilityemail_deleteno sensitive capabilityemail_foldersno sensitive capabilityemail_forwardno sensitive capabilityemail_listno sensitive capabilityemail_mark_readno sensitive capabilityemail_mark_unreadno sensitive capabilityemail_moveno sensitive capabilityemail_readno sensitive capabilityemail_replyno sensitive capabilityemail_searchno sensitive capabilityemail_sendno sensitive capabilityemail_setupno sensitive capabilityemail_statusno sensitive capabilityemail_threadsno sensitive capabilityimage_editno sensitive capabilityimage_generateno sensitive capabilitysearch_code_contextno sensitive capabilitysearch_deepno sensitive capabilitysearch_imagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_newsno sensitive capabilitysearch_researchno sensitive capabilitysearch_semanticno sensitive capabilitysuite_deleteno sensitive capabilitysuite_guideno sensitive capabilitysuite_healthno sensitive capabilitysuite_setupno sensitive capabilitysuite_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.6 latest |
A 96/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-personal-suite --onlineMore in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.