Perplexity Pro (cfdude) MCP Server
mcp-perplexity-pro
npm
v1.3.1
Published by cfdude — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Perplexity API with intelligent model selection
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude-code-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claude-code-bridge.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createServer } from 'http'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claude-code-bridge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/launcher.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, statSync, readdirSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/stdio-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/stdio-bridge.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/stdio-bridge.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/launcher.js:172`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dio server directly import(stdioServerPath).catch(error => { log(`Failed to load stdio server: ${error.messa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/launcher.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"mcp-perplexity-pro" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "console.log('\\n🎉 mcp-perplexity-pro installed successfully!\\n📚 Usage: npx mcp-perplexity-pro --help\\n')"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package mcp-perplexity-pro
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ask_perplexityno sensitive capabilityasync_perplexityno sensitive capabilitychat_perplexityno sensitive capabilitycheck_async_perplexityno sensitive capabilitydelete_project_perplexityno sensitive capabilitylist_async_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_chats_perplexityno sensitive capabilitylist_projects_perplexityno sensitive capabilitymodel_info_perplexityno sensitive capabilityread_chat_perplexityno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
research_perplexityno sensitive capabilitystorage_stats_perplexityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-perplexity-pro --onlineOther implementations of Perplexity Pro 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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