Orchestrator (fkom13) MCP Server
mcp-orchestrator-server
npm
v8.0.5
Published by fkom13 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Serveur MCP pour l'orchestration de tâches distantes (SSH/SFTP) avec une file d'attente persistante.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "task_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec
high Tool "task_exec_interactive" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec_interactive" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive
high Tool "task_exec_sequence" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec_sequence" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "task_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec · inputSchema.properties.cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "task_exec_interactive"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec_interactive" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive · inputSchema.properties.cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "task_exec_sequence"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec_sequence" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "task_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec
low Mutating tool "task_exec_interactive" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec_interactive" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive
low Mutating tool "task_exec_sequence" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec_sequence" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
task_execruns code / shelltask_exec_interactiveruns code / shelltask_exec_sequenceruns code / shellapi_addno sensitive capabilityapi_checkno sensitive capabilityapi_listno sensitive capabilityapi_removeno sensitive capabilitycheck_api_healthno sensitive capabilityget_docker_logsno sensitive capabilityget_fail2ban_statusno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_pm2_logsno sensitive capabilityget_services_statusno sensitive capabilityget_system_resourcesno sensitive capabilitypool_statsno sensitive capabilityqueue_statsno sensitive capabilityserver_addno sensitive capabilityserver_listno sensitive capabilityserver_removeno sensitive capabilitytail_fileno sensitive capabilitytask_historyno sensitive capabilitytask_logsno sensitive capabilitytask_queueno sensitive capabilitytask_retryno sensitive capabilitytask_statusno sensitive capabilitytask_transferno sensitive capabilitytask_transfer_multino sensitive capabilitytestno sensitive capabilitytest_toolno sensitive capabilitytest_tool_with_paramsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v8.0.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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