Orchestrator (yourusername) MCP Server
mcp-orchestrator
npm
v0.6.1
Published by yourusername — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Orchestrator - Discover and install MCPs with automatic OAuth support. Uses Claude CLI for OAuth MCPs (Canva, Asana, etc). 34 trusted MCPs from Claude Partners.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-installer.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Chec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/build-intelligent-index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/build-intelligent-index.js:188`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const compressedPath = exportPath.replace('.json', '.json.gz');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/build-intelligent-index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config-manager.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export class ConfigManager { /** * Detect which Claude product is being
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-mega-crawler.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-mega-crawler.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as https fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-mega-crawler.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth/client-provider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth/client-provider.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; const CALLBACK_PORT = 8095; const CALLBACK_URL = `http://localhost:${CALLBACK_PO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth/client-provider.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/build-intelligent-index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/build-intelligent-index.js:190`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ', '.json.gz'); exec(`gzip -c ${exportPath} > ${compressedPath}`, (error) => { if (!error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/build-intelligent-index.js
Tools 6
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_available_mcpsingests untrusted inputconnect_mcpno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_mcpno sensitive capabilitydiscover_mcpsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_add_commandno sensitive capabilitylist_active_mcpsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.1 latest |
B 83/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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