Memory Gateway MCP Server
mcp-memory-gateway
npm
v0.9.10
Published by igorganapolsky — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
ThumbGate — Pre-action gates that block AI coding agents from repeating known mistakes. SQLite+FTS5 lesson DB with corrective-action inference. MemAlign-inspired dual recall (principles + episodic context). Thompson Sampling for adaptive gate sensitivity.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude-plugin/bundle/server/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude-plugin/bundle/server/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const cliPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'bin', 'cli.js'); const child
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude-plugin/bundle/server/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const { resolveMcpEntry } = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'scripts', 'mcp-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/api/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/api/server.js:2224`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const proxyReq = https.request('https://plausible.io/api/event', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/api/server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:259`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: chExists(cmd) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return true; } catch (_) { return false; } } funct
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:1110`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { startStdioServer } = require(mcpServer); startStdioServer(); // Start watcher as a background daemon alongside MC
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/social-reply-monitor.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/social-reply-monitor.js:154`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '); const res = await fetch('https://www.reddit.com/api/v1/access_token', { method: 'POST', headers: { A
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/social-reply-monitor.js
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/secret-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/secret-scanner.js:35`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: key', regex: /(^|\/)(?:id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_dsa)$/i }, { id: 'pem_key_file', label: 'PEM key file', regex: /\.pem$/i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/secret-scanner.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (plugins/claude-codex-bridge/scripts/codex-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`plugins/claude-codex-bridge/scripts/codex-bridge.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); function getPluginRoot() { return process.env.CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT || path.res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/claude-codex-bridge/scripts/codex-bridge.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js:746`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [${args.map((entry) => JSON.stringif
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/async-job-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/async-job-runner.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const { captureFeedback, analyzeFeedback, getFeedbackPaths, readJSONL } = requ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/async-job-runner.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build-claude-mcpb.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build-claude-mcpb.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const { getClaudePluginVersionedAssetName, } = require('./distribution-surfac
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build-claude-mcpb.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/codegraph-context.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/codegraph-context.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const PROJECT_ROOT = path.join(__dirname, '..'); const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 80
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/codegraph-context.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/contextfs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/contextfs.js:930`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const cwd = process.cwd(); gitContext = { branch: branch || execS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/contextfs.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/daemon-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/daemon-manager.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); const LABEL = 'com.thumbgate.mcp-memory-gateway'; co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/daemon-manager.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/gates-engine.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/gates-engine.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const { isProTier, FREE_TIER_MAX_GATES } = require('./rate-limiter'); /** *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/gates-engine.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/model-tier-router.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/model-tier-router.js:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if (!_config) _config = require(CONFIG_PATH); return _config; } // --------------------------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/model-tier-router.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prove-data-pipeline.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prove-data-pipeline.js:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: che[resolved]; return require(modulePath); } function buildStubTelemetry() { return { window: { window: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prove-data-pipeline.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prove-subway-upgrades.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prove-subway-upgrades.js:67`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: orts const vs = require(vsPath); if (typeof vs.upsertFeedback !== 'function') throw new Error('upsertFee
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prove-subway-upgrades.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prove-xmemory.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prove-xmemory.js:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: che[resolved]; return require(modulePath); } function setupTempFeedbackDir() { const feedbackDir = fs.mkdtempSync(p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prove-xmemory.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/social-analytics/poll-all.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/social-analytics/poll-all.js:54`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { const mod = require(poller.module); const fn = mod[`poll${poller.name.charAt(0).toUpperCase()}${poller
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/social-analytics/poll-all.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"mcp-memory-gateway" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/postinstall.js || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package mcp-memory-gateway
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.10 latest |
B 86/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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