Mailchimp (AlexlaGuardia) MCP Server
mcp-mailchimp
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by alexlaguardia — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([create_webhook, delete_webhook, upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files] → sinks [create_webhook, delete_webhook, upload_file]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → create_webhook
Tools 71
Show each tool and what it can reach · statically extracted from the published source
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egresslist_filesreads sensitive dataupload_filenetwork egressadd_member_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_or_update_memberno sensitive capabilityarchive_memberno sensitive capabilitybatch_subscribe_membersno sensitive capabilitycancel_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_audienceno sensitive capabilitycreate_batch_operationno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_merge_fieldno sensitive capabilitycreate_segmentno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_campaignno sensitive capabilitydelete_member_permanentno sensitive capabilitydelete_segmentno sensitive capabilitydelete_templateno sensitive capabilityget_ab_test_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_audienceno sensitive capabilityget_audience_growthno sensitive capabilityget_audience_locationsno sensitive capabilityget_automationno sensitive capabilityget_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_contentno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_reportno sensitive capabilityget_click_reportno sensitive capabilityget_ecommerce_customerno sensitive capabilityget_email_client_statsno sensitive capabilityget_landing_pageno sensitive capabilityget_memberno sensitive capabilityget_member_activityno sensitive capabilityget_open_reportno sensitive capabilityget_segment_membersno sensitive capabilityget_sent_to_reportno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_unsubscribe_reportno sensitive capabilitylist_audiencesno sensitive capabilitylist_automation_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_automationsno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_ecommerce_storesno sensitive capabilitylist_interest_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_interestsno sensitive capabilitylist_landing_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_member_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_merge_fieldsno sensitive capabilitylist_segmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_store_cartsno sensitive capabilitylist_store_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_store_productsno sensitive capabilitylist_store_promo_codesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymanage_member_tagsno sensitive capabilitypause_automationno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityreplicate_campaignno sensitive capabilityschedule_campaignno sensitive capabilitysearch_membersno sensitive capabilitysend_campaignno sensitive capabilitysend_test_emailno sensitive capabilityset_campaign_contentno sensitive capabilitystart_automationno sensitive capabilityunschedule_campaignno sensitive capabilityupdate_audienceno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaignno sensitive capabilityupdate_segmentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (71 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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